Monday, November 23, 2009
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Friday, November 20, 2009
Monday, October 12, 2009
Saturday, August 1, 2009
Who Killed Chea Vichea?
Loud Mouth Films is proud to present the first U.S. festival screening of Who Killed Chea Vichea? in Providence, Rhode Island on August 7, 2009. The film will screen as a near-complete work in progress.
Filmed over five years in Cambodia, Who Killed Chea Vichea? is a one-hour documentary thriller about the assassination of Cambodia's top labor leader and the police plot to frame two innocent men. Cambodia is one of the world's largest garment producers and exports some $2 billion worth of garments to the U.S. each year.
On a sunny morning in 2004, two men on a motorbike pulled up at a Phnom Penh newsstand. One of them stepped off, walked over to Chea Vichea, the president of the garment workers union, and calmly shot him in the head and in the heart.
Who Killed Chea Vichea? takes us from the dusty streets and slums of Phnom Penh to remote villages, through courtrooms, brothels, factories and gambling dens. It is an unprecedented film about the inner workings of one of the world's most corrupt states.
The film was named one of Amnesty International's top ten "Movies That Matter." It is a co-production of Independent Television Services and WGBH Boston.
"We know there are a lot of Cambodian people in Providence who care about what happens in Cambodia," said the producer, Rich Garella. "We hope to see a big turnout from the Cambodian community."
Who Killed Chea Vichea? will screen at 5:20 PM on Friday, Aug 7, at the Columbus Theatre Arts Center, 270 Broadway, Providence, along with the short films In Their Boots: Broken Promise by Abe Greenwald, and Open Air by Shira-Lee Shalit.
Film web site: http://www.whokilledcheavichea.com/
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
SON TAY Rescue Operation Kingpin is where American CHEAT Cambodian (5/5 End)
BY: SOURN SEREY RATHA & BP
Cambodian Action Committee for Justice & Equity (CACJE)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
The whole Son Tay incarceration facility was buried three meters deep underground. The whole facility was covert by a field of thatch with eight almost horizontal access doors of seventy centimeters width, one at each cardinal point. The door was open with a cranked system, well camouflaged under the thick thatch.
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
The whole Son Tay incarceration facility was buried three meters deep underground. The whole facility was covert by a field of thatch with eight almost horizontal access doors of seventy centimeters width, one at each cardinal point. The door was open with a cranked system, well camouflaged under the thick thatch.
There were hundred Cambodians who were prisoners at Son Tay. Only a few came out alive. Several years later, the most famous prisoners who came out alive after several years of incarceration were the former Prime Minister Pen Sovan and Col Ly Thieng Chek.
20. At the first half hour of Son Tay assault, the US Air support cannot help 1,100 Khmer Krom soldiers because of the very closeness of combat. The 1,100 fought alone to accomplish their mission. The North Vietnamese soldiers were far outnumbered Khmer Krom soldiers 1 to 20.
21. When Capt Chau Dara saw the two helicopters HH-53s “Apple 01 - 02” were taking off with all the Green Berets aboard and flew away toward Thailand, Capt Chau Dara was convinced that the helicopters would not come back to pick them. So, he led seven survivors of the 1,100 Khmer Krom and fled toward Cambodia by following the same path they had come into Son Tay. All the survivors were injured. They crossed the Song Con River on that very early morning by the nylon rope to the opposite Song Con River bank.
There, they waited for 36 hours for the other survivors. Their communication radios C-25 were fallen in the river, therefore impossible to repair. Then Capt Nao Eng threw it in the river.
Two other Cambodian raider survivors from Battalion 149 escaped by their own mean to Laos.
Four Cambodian raider survivors were badly injured with no medicine, no foods and especially no water. Their C-25 radios were out impossible to repair.
22. Khmer Krom Son Tay raider’s sacrifice was enormous.
Finally, of the 1,100 Khmer Krom Special Forces who participated in Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin, all in all, only five survived and arrived to Cambodia.
· All the Khmer Krom battalion 137 of 800 soldiers commanded by Capt Thach Hén was annihilated. All officers and privates of the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 volunteered for Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin were all killed. No survivor.
Capt Thach Hén had served the CIA for more than twenty-one years.
· Of the three hundred Kanseign Sar Son Tay raiders of the Battalion 149, only nine survived: (a) Seven Son Tay raider survivors would escape and flee to Cambodia under the direction of Capt Chau Dara. Of these seven survivors, four would suicide in midway, and (b) Two others survivors escaped by their own mean toward Lao.
· Indeed, Capt Hem Sim, Capt Kao Dob, Capt Kao Dorn and Capt Thach Loi of the Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 escaped and fled toward Cambodia under the direction of Capt Chau Dara, but they were all very badly injured.
After one month of escape, without medicine, food and essentially water, Capt Hem Sim, Capt Kao Dob, Capt Kao Dorn and Capt Thach Loi preferred the suicide in midway toward Cambodia with the special CIA two-bullets cigarette pistol. They fired themselves a bullet in their own head.
22. A Black Recon Team.
Almost two months later after the D-Day, after fleeing Son Tay, that’s one month after the suicide of their four colleagues in midway, the three remaining Cambodian Special Force Son Tay raider survivors led by Capt Chau Dara reached the South of Khe Sanh, Vietnam, near the junction of the three frontiers Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
They met there in the forest a Recon Team of five Black Americans soldiers and one guide Khmer Krom from South Vietnam.
It was Capt Nao Eng who discovered first the black officer who climbed the tree to call in a sanitary helicopter.
The American Recon Team did not see the Cambodian raiders. It was Capt Nao Eng who saw them first.
The black officer made a hand sign telling Cambodian survivors that he called in one helicopter.
This was the first time the Recon Black American team and the three Cambodian Son Tay raiders met together. They never met each other before. By using map and some special convened signs they convinced mutually they were friends.
The American Recon Team had medicine, foods and water. They shared all they have with the three Cambodian survivors. One black soldier was badly injured by booby trap. So they needed the sanitary extraction by helicopter.
The American Recon Team did not know very well the battleground of this area because they want to cross Ratanakiri province to reach an American base at Tay Ninh in South Vietnam.
You must not do that, advised Chau Dara. Then, Dara proposed to go first alone to check the Ratanakiri village situation. In effect Ratanakiri was infested of North Vietnamese soldiers. Several North Vietnamese divisions stationed there in preparation to attack the South Vietnam.
With this proof, Chau Dara successfully convinced the Recon Black American Team not the cross Ratatanakiri. Chau Dara advised them to direct their escape toward Stung Trèng then fly to Thailand. That’s what was done.
The Recon Black American Team had succeeded to contact one US helicopter to pick them all and land the three Khmer Krom Son Tay raiders at Stung Trèng. Then the helicopter flew the Recon Black American Team finally to Thailand.
The danger between Khe Sanh and Stung Trèng was so great because the minority ethnic in these remote villages were allied with the communist North Vietnam. They would signal any movement to the North Vietnam army. So the life of any escapee was in extreme danger.
24. Five years later, the Khmer Rouge communist took power in Cambodia, on April 17, 1975. Among the five survivors of the 1,100 Cambodian Special Force Son Tay raiders, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray will be murdered by the Khmer Rouge one yaer after the Khmer Rouge victory.
Capt Nao Eng refused to flee to Thailand after the Khmer Rouge Victory because of Son Tay Raid. The American had abandoned him at Son Tay.
A few months after Son Tay Rescue operation Kingpin, the North Vietnam soldiers rounded up all male population near Lang Hei, the nearby CIA Laotian town advanced post. They were about one hundred Cambodian men.
The North Vietnamese soldiers herded them toward Stung Treng, Northern Cambodian province, then crucified and nailed them all to the trees, and left them all die slowly and atrociously.
That was and still is the abominable North Vietnamese punishment to those who dared to oppose to Hanoi enslavement of Cambodia and Laos policy.
May 2008, two Cambodian KANSEIGN SAR Son Tay Raiders survivors, Capt Chau Dara Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 commander and Lt Thach Channy lived in the US and the third, Capt Thach Sareth lived in Cambodia. These three were the only survivors of the Cambodian component of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin.
The 1,100 Cambodian KANSEIGN SAR and Khmer Krom raiders had left behind their wives and children who lived right now in Cambodia. Their lives are in very danger if the Vietnamese knew they were Kanseign Sar families. Kanseign Sar still continues to fight for freedom as always.
25. Financial Rewards
CIA Maj. Ed Neal has promised to KANSEIGN SAR Organization (Cambodian Special Forces organization) through Capt Thach Hén the reward of five million dollars for their participation to the Operation Kingpin.
Only the following people had received the compensation:
(1) About three hundred wives or parents of the 800 Khmer Krom soldiers of the Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén, and
(2) One hundred wives of parents of the Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 soldiers led by Capt Chau Dara.
For an officer the reward was two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), and for the private four hundred fifty dollars (in US dollars of 1970).
Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray had received twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500) each. That’s all.
26. KANSEIGN SAR Special Forces Organization under the President of General Chau Dara needed your help to render justice for the ultimate sacrifice and to honor their soldiers for their defense of freedom and independence and democracy and in accomplishment with bravura and extreme sacrifice of their Rescue Kingpin Operation of Son Tay American POWs. Flesh, blood and tears of their sacrifice must not be forgotten.
Eleven hundred Kanseign Sar and Khmer Krom soldiers had sacrificed their life in Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin because Kanseign Sar and Khmer Krom had confidence that the United States would help Cambodia to fight against the totalitarianism, defend Cambodia sovereignty, independence, freedom and democracy and fight against the North Vietnamese swallow of Cambodia by forces.
Since the withdrawal of the US Armed Forces from Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Army hitherto occupied Cambodia. Hanoi policy was to swallow Cambodia.
The US and Vietnam were co-signatory of the November 23, 1991 Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia. The US must oblige Hanoi to integrally respect the 1991 Paris Peace agreement on Cambodia which stipulated that Vietnam should withdraw all their armed forces from Cambodia. Up to these days, the People Army of Vietnam (PAVN) still occupied Cambodia.
27. For security reason, the names of the three Cambodian Raiders survivors of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin are acronyms. The others are real, Please do contact Authors for your concerned...
The US and Vietnam were co-signatory of the November 23, 1991 Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia. The US must oblige Hanoi to integrally respect the 1991 Paris Peace agreement on Cambodia which stipulated that Vietnam should withdraw all their armed forces from Cambodia. Up to these days, the People Army of Vietnam (PAVN) still occupied Cambodia.
27. For security reason, the names of the three Cambodian Raiders survivors of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin are acronyms. The others are real, Please do contact Authors for your concerned...
SON TAY Rescue Operation Kingpin is where American CHEAT Cambodian (4/5)
BY: SOURN SEREY RATHA & BP
The CBU were supposed to clear the passage for the 1,100 Khmer Krom soldiers to assault Son Tay Prison by killing or maiming most of the enemy. When the two HH-53s “Apple 01 - 02” had landed and disgorged the bulk US assault forces respectively the “Greenleaf” command group of 22 Green Berets led by Col Arthur “Bull” Simon and the “Redwine” support group of 20 Green Berets led by Lt Col Elliott Bud Sydnor, Capt Thach Hén told in communication radio to his US relay communication radio officer and Capt Chau Dara that the HH-53 “Apple 01” of Col Bull Simon had landed in a wrong place.
A few minutes after the F-4D had dropped three CBUs:
(1) Capt Chau Dara led his Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 of 300 men to assault Son Tay Prison from the Western side;
(2) Then Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep led their Khmer Krom Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers to occupy the emplacement left by Chau Dara battalion and then followed from behind the Kanseignn Sar Battalion 149 commanded by Chau Dara to assault Son Tay Prison.
When, Capt Chau Dara saw the HH-3 “Banana 01” crashed inside Son Tay Prison, Capt Chau Dara and Capt Nao Eng thought the helicopter HH-3 “Banana 01”was shot down by North Vietnamese soldiers.
Capt Chau Dara had seen American POWs captured in forest by North Vietnamese troopers. And he had seen before, when the North Vietnamese soldiers captured the American pilots, the North Vietnamese troopers routinely and ferociously tortured the captured American prisoners.
For this reason, Capt Chau Dara assaulted and ran full speed to rescue the helicopter HH-3 “Banana 01” crews. They did not run in line one behind another. They ran to envelop the Prison from all the Western side as quickly as they can. In principle, he might lose some soldiers to Vietnamese booby traps but not so many if they follow the well known procedure to avoid booby traps, by following in locked steps the precedent ones.
The North Vietnamese defense of Son Tay Prison was organized systematically in two lines: (1) As first line of defense, 38 trenches were dug near the Prison walls and (2) Hundred and hundred of booby traps holes were dug and well camouflaged at about 100-200 meters from the Prison walls as second line of defense.
The Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 was overwhelmed by the fire barrier of the North Vietnamese security guards of the 38 trenches defense perimeter outside the Son Tay Prison.
In a few minutes Cambodian Battalion 149 lose two third of her effective to the booby traps and fire wall barrier from the 38 trenches because they speed up and ran very quickly as they can to rescue the crashed HH-3 “Banana 01” crews.
If the objective was to overrun Son Tay Prison, they would sneak inside and kill all the guard by surprise by using all the arms they brought in. As they were coming to assault the Son Tay Prison, their procedure was to avoid Vietnamese booby traps. They would not fall so many in the hundreds booby traps around Son Tay Prison if hey had not ran full speed to rescue the HH-3 Banana 01 crews. Kanseign Sar strike forces were decimated.
Then about one hundred of Chau Dara battalion survivors who came out of the booby traps areas and can run ran and assaulted in full speed Son Tay Prison.
This time, bad luck stroke again, they ran on the unexploded CBU’s bomblets dropped by the F-4D Falcon. In fifteen minutes, all the remaining of Khmer Krom Battalion 149 was exterminated by the CBU’s unexploded bomblets, safe nine. Only nine came out alive from the killing zone created by hundreds and hundreds Vietnamese booby traps, the North Vietnamese fire wall barrier and the three CBU’s bomblets.
16. According to the CIA order, firstly Chau Dara Battalion assaulted the Son Tay Prison, then, Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep must lead their Khmer Krom Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers to occupy Chau Dara battalion’s emplacement.
Almost seven hundred meters separated the two Cambodian Special Forces assault battalions.
The US F-4D Falcon pilot informed Capt Thach Hén that there were North Vietnamese defense trenches lines between Thach Hén Battalion 137 and Son Tay Prison.
About several thousands North Vietnamese forces in the trenches, and underground in charge of the defense of Son Tay Prison with all they can throw in the battle annihilated the Khmer Kroms Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén.
Capt Thach Hén battalion assault fell on that North Vietnamese trenches perimeter defense line.
This explained also why the F-4D bombed with three CBUs that very close area to Khmer Krom battalions. The F-4D tried to help the Khmer Krom Capt Thach Hén Battalion 137. The F-4D Falcon intended to crush with three CBUs the North Vietnamese forces line of defense inside the trenches. But the three CBU spread their hundred of bomblets which would kill also a lot of Cambodian soldiers.
The CBU’s bomblets, the North Vietnamese booby traps, and the overwhelming NV counterattack annihilated the Cambodian battalion 137. In about fifteen minutes all the 800 soldiers of Capt Thach Hén battalion 137 were killed. They all die atrociously.
Capt Chau Dara heard so well the bullets hitting the bodies, almost no missing bullets. Every bullet hit several bodies; this will create a special sound, a very special macabre sound. The two sides, Vietnamese and Cambodian were so close to each other. The slaughtering was total. He heard cries and death moans of his arm brothers. The slaughtering lasted only about fifteen minutes. Then a murderous silence felt over that night. All Capt Thach Hén Khmer Krom Battalion 137 were exterminated. Only nine from Capt Chau Dara Battalion 149 survived but all injured.
The Northern and Western sides of Son Tay Prison were infested of hundred and hundred Vietnamese booby traps. Hundreds of new ones were intertwined with hundreds of the old ones. Our Khmer Special Forces acknowledged the new booby traps from the old ones by the freshness of the remaining foods left behind in the trenches nearby. But Cambodian Special Forces would not lose so many soldiers to the booby traps if they would not be inducted in errors to believe they have to run to save the helicopter HH-3 Banana 01 crews.
Without doubt, the sacrifice of Cambodian Special Forces had stopped and delayed the North Vietnamese troop reinforcement at least thirty minutes.
Indeed, at least, first, the North Vietnamese reinforcement needed fifteen minutes to annihilate the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers commanded by Thach Hén and second, they needed also at least fifteen minutes to cover the one mile distance from that point of battlefield to reach Son Tay Prison gate, the landing zone of the HH-53s Apple 01-02.
The American raiding force, that’s the 56 Green Berets and the two helicopters HH-53 Apple 01-02, had been on the ground only 27 minutes.
The sacrifice of Cambodian Special Forces had played without doubt an important role in delaying the reinforcement of North Vietnamese troops which would surround the 56 Green Berets and block their extraction by the two helicopter HH-53 Apple 01 and 02.
17. Why the 56 Green Berets were not injured with the booby traps? Following the same logic, the Southern Son Tay Prison was infested with hundred and hundred of booby traps too. But thank to the vertical insertion within 100 meters of the Son Tay Prison walls. This explained why the 56 Green Berets raiders were not injured by the booby traps.
Rows after rows of “villager houses” close to Son Tay Prison were in reality the North Vietnamese military casern but very well camouflaged as villager houses. Those rows of houses housed several hundreds soldiers equipped with the complete armaments. They formed the first manned line of defense of Son Tay camp.
In reality, the “Secondary School” was the prisoner interrogation center, to sort the prisoners. Once the prisoners were sorted, they were sent to incarceration facility underground.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Chhin Saray and Capt Yip Tep and Capt Nao Eng knew so well that the situation was extremely tough.
But everybody had confidence in Capt Chau Dara to lead them all to the safety because Chau Dara knew very well the battleground. He knew where to hide and escape.
18. Under the chaos, the 56 Breen Beret raiders withdrew and were lifted by the two HH-53s “Apple 01 and Apple 02” and flying back to Thailand. At 02:36 the first helicopter extraction was made, followed by the second at 02:45. .
The American raiding force had been on the ground only 27 minutes. By 03:15 the American raiding force was out of North Vietnam, and landed back at Udon at 04:28, five hours after launch.
It was a brilliant victory well coordinating and well timing for the US Armed Forces, even without the freed prisoners.
All the 56 Green Berets were returned home safely. Only Sgt LeRoy Wrigth of the “Blueboy” team had the ankle fractured when the HH-3 made a risky crashed landing inside So Tay Prison.
For their actions, members of the Son Tay Rescue Operation “Kingpin” received 6 Distinguished Service Crosses, 5 Air Force Crosses, and 83 Silver Stars, including all members of the ground force. The successful demonstration of capability in Operations Kingpin was in part responsible for the creation of a joint United States Special Operations Command in 1987. President Nixon was very satisfied of the Operation Kingpin.
The Operation Kingpin was a great success according to the press, and political leaders.
19. Underground Son Tay Prison. Son Tay Prison was in reality a facility built three meters deep underground in the shape of a star pointed to the eight cardinals, and at the center with the dimensions 40 meters x 60 meters. At every eight point star triangle of three meters side was prisoner-cells. The guards blindfolded the prisoners and turned them around several times to disorient them before sending them to the prison cells. (Be Continue @ 5/5 End)
SON TAY Rescue Operation Kingpin is where American CHEAT Cambodian (3/5)
BY: SOURN SEREY RATHA & BP
Cambodian Action Committee for Justice & Equity (CACJE)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
He will know the participation of the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 with the Operation Kingpin only twelve hours before the assault H-Hour. It was Capt Thach Hén who revealed the secret to him.
And he still didn’t know about the main component, the American assault Forces of Operation Kingpin. He knew it only when he saw it with his naked eyes flying over to assault Son Tay Prison.
8. The insertion to the North Vietnam by surface encountered two imminent risks: the risk of dying by the booby trap and the risk of dying by the land mine. Capt Chau Dara, if he had to die, preferred to die by land mine. For this reason, he chose the procedure to avoid the booby trap, that’s, one soldier should follow from behind the other one in locked step; and five meters distance must separate laterally or in column two soldiers. The group leader must have a bamboo pole of five meters long to probe the booby trap. That’s the way the North Vietnamese soldiers moved to avoid the booby traps. That is a procedure, they learned from the North Vietnamese soldiers.
He led the column from the Chinook helicopter dropping zone toward Son Tay Prison. Finally he inserted successfully his 300 special force soldiers on the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The CIA order was: Deploy the whole Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 on the western side of Son Tay prison and the deployment must be completed on November 20th , that’s the D-Day eve (D-Day minus one).
The Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 came from Cambodia. So to reach Son Tay Prison, they had to cross the Song Con River. Indeed, Son Tay Prison was in opposite river bank when coming from Cambodia.
Capt Chau Dara was the first to swim and cross the Song Con River. The Song Con River current was strong during November. With his nylon rope he helped the remaining 300 soldiers to cross the Song Con River at night. They swam at night and used the nylon rope to cross and transport all their armament and ammunitions to the other Son Con River bank. It took three nights for the battalion 149 to cross the Son Con River at night. The battalion 149 was completely inserted on November 20th about 14:00. His troops discovered hundreds and hundreds of booby traps, nearby their emplacement where they were burying in. Then they started to render those surrounding booby traps inoperative.
The operation Kingpin started indeed on November 21st, at 02:18 (a.m.).
Then Capt Chau Dara returned to occupy his old trench in front of the Son Tay Prison narrow door. Capt Chau Dara trench was at the most Southern point of Chau Dara assault line. The remaining 300 soldiers were spreading all along Song Con River bank toward the Northern side of Son Tay Prison.
On D-Day eve, Capt Chau Dara started to count the number of North Vietnamese security guards inside Son Tay Prison.
By counting the guards in and out, and noting the different uniforms they wore, there were in all only ninety soldiers including two dozens female inside Son Tay Prison.
According to Capt Thach Hén order, the Battalion 149 should be within 500 meters from the Son Tay Prison.
Eight hundred yards away far North on the same Son Con River bank was positioned the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep. Then, they were digging and burying and waiting to strike since D-Day eve.
In recapitulation, on H-Hour minus twelve, the Battalion 149 was digging and burying in the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The Battalion 149 arrived first at Son Tay, then, followed the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep.
9. Each Khmer Krom Special Force soldier carried his CAR-15, and M18 for Capt Chau Dara, one 0.357 Magnum handgun, one CIA suicide pistol in shape of cigarette packet with two bullets, 240 CAR-15 rounds, three hand grenades, Claymore mines, and three (tube) TOW 2, communication radio C-25s and foods for fifteen days.
10. It took fifteen days to walk from the camp base to Son Tay Prison. The food rations distributed to each Cambodian soldier were only for fifteen days.
At that time the Cambodian Special Forces leadership did not know why and did not make attention to this revealing point. Only month later, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray understood that the US planers of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin did not expect Cambodian Special Forces would survive. They thought that all Cambodian soldier assault forces would be all exterminated by the North Vietnamese Army. The US strategic planers did not expect Cambodian assault force survivors. They abandoned Cambodian assault forces to their fate.
11. Execution.
The total surprise would be the best weapon for the success.
On November 20, 1970 night, Capt Chau Dara started to cut the protection Son Tay Prison barbed wires, therefore free the access to Son Tay Prison door.
The Capt Chau Dara Battalion 149 was the main assault force of the Cambodian component of Operation Kingpin. Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 had the insigne honor to lead the assault of Son Tay Prison.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Yip Tep and Capt Chhin Saray spoke fluently the English and were in direct communication with the relay communication radio officers of US rescue assault forces while Capt Chau Dara spoke barely the English.
On D-Day eve, about 14:00, that’s H-Hour minus twelve hours, Capt Thach Hén called in Capt Nao Eng. Then, Nao Eng passed the communication radio to Capt Chau Dara. By listening to the clear voice of Capt Thach Hén in his communication radio, Capt Nao Eng knew already that Capt Thach Hén was close to his position. Only at that precise moment, Capt Chau Dara knew that the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén had joint him to assault Son Tay Prison.
12. WHAT IF
Capt Chau Dara and Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray said jokingly to Capt Thach Hén: “Since Son Tay prison was defended by only ninety North Vietnamese security guards, so, let the Battalion 149 assaulted it, subdued it and free all the American POWs.
Capt Chau Dara said: With our 300 Cambodian Special forces soldiers, we can do it. We will sneak inside and attack by surprise. With Claymore mine we will destroy first the narrow door and Son Tay Prison walls. The fundamental basis of the surprise is: the Cambodian look like a Vietnamese. Wearing Vietnamese uniform and cask, the Cambodian Special Forces soldiers look like exactly a Bo Doi’ (Vietnamese soldiers).
The surprise will be total, as had shown our insertion of 1,100 Cambodian Special Forces soldiers in the close perimeter of Son Tay Prison defense line, said Capt Chau Dara.
They waited for the order to implement the very fundamental Cambodian plan to overrun Son Tay Prison and free Son Tay POWs. The green light order will never come.
When the commanding MC 130 “Cherry 01” flying in convoy pulling the five heavily loaded HH-53s “Apple 01 - 05” and the HH-3 “Banana 01” were over and illuminating Son Tay sky, and the HH-3 “Banana 01” was crash-landing inside Son Tay Prison, only then, Capt Chau Dara acknowledged the US forces were coming. But he was not aware the main American ground assault forces were formed only by the 56 Green Berets.
13. Even today, Capt Chau Dara still believed that his battalion 149 with his 300 elite soldiers can overrun Son Tay Prison and free the American POWs.
He still believed he could avoid hundred and hundred booby traps and occupy Son Tay Prison if he had not to run to rescue the crashed-landed HH-3 “Banana 01” inside Son Tay Prison.
His big mistake was to believe that the HH-3 “Banana 01” had crashed inside Son Tay Prison. He did not see it as a controlled landing. For that reason he had to run full speed to rescue the injured “Banana 01” crews in Son Tay Prison.
14. On D-Day minus twelve hours, that is November 20, 14:00 Capt Thach Hén revealed to Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 and Khmer Krom Battalion 137 commanders that the two battalions were assigned conjointly to the same Son Tay Operation Kingpin to free the American POWs at Son Tay.
Separately each battalion commanders knew only about their own assignment to the Son Tay Raid Kingpin. It was a limited assignment, but very important already by itself.
Still each battalion commanders believed they were honored to be chosen to participate in that very important Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Chhin Saray and Capt Chip Tep knew so well the situation was extremely tough.
The H-Hour was November 21, 02:18. At H-Hour, the HH-3 “Banana 01” made a risky crashed landing inside of Son Tay Prison, and disgorged the “Blueboy” assault team of 14 Green Berets led by Capt Richard J Meadows. Then Capt Thach Hén ordered Dara to assault Son Tay Prison.
15. A few minutes before the H-Hour, HH-3 “Banana 01” crashed-landing inside Son Tay Prison, one F-4D-Falcon pilot, on his first swoop, by communication radio, asked Capt Nao Eng, to reconfirm the coordinates of Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 position, then dropped a big CBU (Cluster Bomber Unit).
Then another F-4D Falcon swooped and dropped a couple of CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units). In all Dara saw, the F-4D had dropped three CBUs. A typical 600-pound CBU contains 150 bomblets (3 pounds) which would fall over an area fifty meters wide and two hundred meters long. Any unprotected people within this 50 – by 200 meters area had a better than 50 percent chance of being injured. (Be Continue @ 4/5)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
He will know the participation of the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 with the Operation Kingpin only twelve hours before the assault H-Hour. It was Capt Thach Hén who revealed the secret to him.
And he still didn’t know about the main component, the American assault Forces of Operation Kingpin. He knew it only when he saw it with his naked eyes flying over to assault Son Tay Prison.
8. The insertion to the North Vietnam by surface encountered two imminent risks: the risk of dying by the booby trap and the risk of dying by the land mine. Capt Chau Dara, if he had to die, preferred to die by land mine. For this reason, he chose the procedure to avoid the booby trap, that’s, one soldier should follow from behind the other one in locked step; and five meters distance must separate laterally or in column two soldiers. The group leader must have a bamboo pole of five meters long to probe the booby trap. That’s the way the North Vietnamese soldiers moved to avoid the booby traps. That is a procedure, they learned from the North Vietnamese soldiers.
He led the column from the Chinook helicopter dropping zone toward Son Tay Prison. Finally he inserted successfully his 300 special force soldiers on the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The CIA order was: Deploy the whole Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 on the western side of Son Tay prison and the deployment must be completed on November 20th , that’s the D-Day eve (D-Day minus one).
The Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 came from Cambodia. So to reach Son Tay Prison, they had to cross the Song Con River. Indeed, Son Tay Prison was in opposite river bank when coming from Cambodia.
Capt Chau Dara was the first to swim and cross the Song Con River. The Song Con River current was strong during November. With his nylon rope he helped the remaining 300 soldiers to cross the Song Con River at night. They swam at night and used the nylon rope to cross and transport all their armament and ammunitions to the other Son Con River bank. It took three nights for the battalion 149 to cross the Son Con River at night. The battalion 149 was completely inserted on November 20th about 14:00. His troops discovered hundreds and hundreds of booby traps, nearby their emplacement where they were burying in. Then they started to render those surrounding booby traps inoperative.
The operation Kingpin started indeed on November 21st, at 02:18 (a.m.).
Then Capt Chau Dara returned to occupy his old trench in front of the Son Tay Prison narrow door. Capt Chau Dara trench was at the most Southern point of Chau Dara assault line. The remaining 300 soldiers were spreading all along Song Con River bank toward the Northern side of Son Tay Prison.
On D-Day eve, Capt Chau Dara started to count the number of North Vietnamese security guards inside Son Tay Prison.
By counting the guards in and out, and noting the different uniforms they wore, there were in all only ninety soldiers including two dozens female inside Son Tay Prison.
According to Capt Thach Hén order, the Battalion 149 should be within 500 meters from the Son Tay Prison.
Eight hundred yards away far North on the same Son Con River bank was positioned the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep. Then, they were digging and burying and waiting to strike since D-Day eve.
In recapitulation, on H-Hour minus twelve, the Battalion 149 was digging and burying in the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The Battalion 149 arrived first at Son Tay, then, followed the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep.
9. Each Khmer Krom Special Force soldier carried his CAR-15, and M18 for Capt Chau Dara, one 0.357 Magnum handgun, one CIA suicide pistol in shape of cigarette packet with two bullets, 240 CAR-15 rounds, three hand grenades, Claymore mines, and three (tube) TOW 2, communication radio C-25s and foods for fifteen days.
10. It took fifteen days to walk from the camp base to Son Tay Prison. The food rations distributed to each Cambodian soldier were only for fifteen days.
At that time the Cambodian Special Forces leadership did not know why and did not make attention to this revealing point. Only month later, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray understood that the US planers of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin did not expect Cambodian Special Forces would survive. They thought that all Cambodian soldier assault forces would be all exterminated by the North Vietnamese Army. The US strategic planers did not expect Cambodian assault force survivors. They abandoned Cambodian assault forces to their fate.
11. Execution.
The total surprise would be the best weapon for the success.
On November 20, 1970 night, Capt Chau Dara started to cut the protection Son Tay Prison barbed wires, therefore free the access to Son Tay Prison door.
The Capt Chau Dara Battalion 149 was the main assault force of the Cambodian component of Operation Kingpin. Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 had the insigne honor to lead the assault of Son Tay Prison.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Yip Tep and Capt Chhin Saray spoke fluently the English and were in direct communication with the relay communication radio officers of US rescue assault forces while Capt Chau Dara spoke barely the English.
On D-Day eve, about 14:00, that’s H-Hour minus twelve hours, Capt Thach Hén called in Capt Nao Eng. Then, Nao Eng passed the communication radio to Capt Chau Dara. By listening to the clear voice of Capt Thach Hén in his communication radio, Capt Nao Eng knew already that Capt Thach Hén was close to his position. Only at that precise moment, Capt Chau Dara knew that the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén had joint him to assault Son Tay Prison.
12. WHAT IF
Capt Chau Dara and Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray said jokingly to Capt Thach Hén: “Since Son Tay prison was defended by only ninety North Vietnamese security guards, so, let the Battalion 149 assaulted it, subdued it and free all the American POWs.
Capt Chau Dara said: With our 300 Cambodian Special forces soldiers, we can do it. We will sneak inside and attack by surprise. With Claymore mine we will destroy first the narrow door and Son Tay Prison walls. The fundamental basis of the surprise is: the Cambodian look like a Vietnamese. Wearing Vietnamese uniform and cask, the Cambodian Special Forces soldiers look like exactly a Bo Doi’ (Vietnamese soldiers).
The surprise will be total, as had shown our insertion of 1,100 Cambodian Special Forces soldiers in the close perimeter of Son Tay Prison defense line, said Capt Chau Dara.
They waited for the order to implement the very fundamental Cambodian plan to overrun Son Tay Prison and free Son Tay POWs. The green light order will never come.
When the commanding MC 130 “Cherry 01” flying in convoy pulling the five heavily loaded HH-53s “Apple 01 - 05” and the HH-3 “Banana 01” were over and illuminating Son Tay sky, and the HH-3 “Banana 01” was crash-landing inside Son Tay Prison, only then, Capt Chau Dara acknowledged the US forces were coming. But he was not aware the main American ground assault forces were formed only by the 56 Green Berets.
13. Even today, Capt Chau Dara still believed that his battalion 149 with his 300 elite soldiers can overrun Son Tay Prison and free the American POWs.
He still believed he could avoid hundred and hundred booby traps and occupy Son Tay Prison if he had not to run to rescue the crashed-landed HH-3 “Banana 01” inside Son Tay Prison.
His big mistake was to believe that the HH-3 “Banana 01” had crashed inside Son Tay Prison. He did not see it as a controlled landing. For that reason he had to run full speed to rescue the injured “Banana 01” crews in Son Tay Prison.
14. On D-Day minus twelve hours, that is November 20, 14:00 Capt Thach Hén revealed to Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 and Khmer Krom Battalion 137 commanders that the two battalions were assigned conjointly to the same Son Tay Operation Kingpin to free the American POWs at Son Tay.
Separately each battalion commanders knew only about their own assignment to the Son Tay Raid Kingpin. It was a limited assignment, but very important already by itself.
Still each battalion commanders believed they were honored to be chosen to participate in that very important Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Chhin Saray and Capt Chip Tep knew so well the situation was extremely tough.
The H-Hour was November 21, 02:18. At H-Hour, the HH-3 “Banana 01” made a risky crashed landing inside of Son Tay Prison, and disgorged the “Blueboy” assault team of 14 Green Berets led by Capt Richard J Meadows. Then Capt Thach Hén ordered Dara to assault Son Tay Prison.
15. A few minutes before the H-Hour, HH-3 “Banana 01” crashed-landing inside Son Tay Prison, one F-4D-Falcon pilot, on his first swoop, by communication radio, asked Capt Nao Eng, to reconfirm the coordinates of Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 position, then dropped a big CBU (Cluster Bomber Unit).
Then another F-4D Falcon swooped and dropped a couple of CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units). In all Dara saw, the F-4D had dropped three CBUs. A typical 600-pound CBU contains 150 bomblets (3 pounds) which would fall over an area fifty meters wide and two hundred meters long. Any unprotected people within this 50 – by 200 meters area had a better than 50 percent chance of being injured. (Be Continue @ 4/5)
SON TAY Rescue Operation Kingpin is where American CHEAT Cambodian (2/5)
BY: SOURN SEREY RATHA & BP
Cambodian Action Committee for Justice & Equity (CACJE)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
5. The Cambodian Genesis of Son Tay Rescue Operation, a Cambodian Concept.
The Cambodian Special Forces Son Tay raider’s leadership did not know the origin of the American plan of Rescue of Son Tay Prison American POWs, the Operation Kingpin.
But, from the Cambodian point of view, there was a Cambodian concept to rescue Cambodian POWs in Son Tay Prison.
Capt Thach Kay had the information that 42 Kanseign Sar POWs were prisoners at Son Tay Prison. They were very badly and very often tortured. Capt Thach Kay discussed with Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chhin Saray and Capt Nao Eng about the feasibility of rescue of those brother Kanseign Sar POWs in Son Tay Prison.
To prove that our brother combatants will never be abandoned and to elevate the moral of the troops, Capt Thach Hén submitted to his supervisor CIA Maj. ED NEAL his ardent intention to rescue the 42 Khmer Krom Kanseign Sar POWs locked in Son Tay Prison who were captured by North Vietnam Army for accomplishing their missions in the North Vietnam.
Capt Chhin Saray had four cousins, Kanseign Sar officers and Capt Nao Eng had two cousins Kanseign Sar officers who were prisoners in Son Tay. For this reason, was born the concept to rescue their cousins locked in Son Tay Prison.
It was Capt Thach Kay and Capt Chhin Sary and Capt Nao Eng who were the first to suggest the operation to rescue their cousin prisoners. They talked to Capt Thach Hén who in return talked to the CIA supervisor Capt ED NEAL.
To do it successfully we need the leadership of Capt Chau Dara, said Capt Chhin Saray because Capt Chau Dara is the only one who knew very well the geography of the area. The surprise would be the best weapon for the success.
Then Capt Thach Hén discussed with Capt Chau Dara about the rescue operation of Son Tay prisoners and simply added that the CIA agreed to pay a lot of money, $5 million dollars for the Rescue of Son Tay POWs.
Capt Chau Dara knew so well Son Tay camp and the nearby surrounding area on Laos-Vietnam border zone because he lived for several years in that region among North Vietnamese soldiers. He knew the minority ethnics in that region; he had friends over there. He had a support team.
From there, maybe, was born the Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin.
Afterward the rescue operation project was taken over by the US Army to rescue its pilot prisoners. Then the project took another direction, then, became the Operation Kingpin.
6. Intelligence about Son Tay Prison
Three months before the Operation Kingpin’s D-Day, Capt Thach Hén, according to the CIA Maj. Ed Neal order, sent Kanseign Sar spies to Son Tay to gather the information relative to the two following crucial points:
(1)Are there American POWs at Son Tay Prison? How Many?
(2) How many North Vietnamese security guards are there in Son Tay Prison?
Three months before the D-Day, in September 1970, according the CIA assignment, Capt Thach Hén ordered Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray to spy the Son Tay Prison.
For this purpose, according to the American concept of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin, a small secret CIA camp base was set near Nong Hêt/Lang Hei, a small Laotian village on Lao-North Vietnam border, Southern of Dien Bien Phu and about 100 miles from Son Tay camp. From Lang Hei, Kanseign Sar spies were sent to spy Son Tay Prison.
First Spy Mission over Son Tay Prison, in September 1970:
Capt Chau Dara remembered very well because it was just before the Buddhist feast Pchum Ben, commemorating the pass away of the loved ones. First Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray walked in for five days to reach Son Tay Prison and reported back in September 1970 to Capt Thach Hén:
(1) They did not see American POW in Son Tay Prison;
(2) There was one battalion of about 500 North Vietnamese security guards at Son Tay Prison.
Second Spy Mission on Son Tay Prison, in September 1970:
Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray were resent to spy Son Tay Prison one more time. They got the same result: They did not see American POWs in Son Tay Prison and there was one battalion of about 500 North Vietnamese security guards at Son Tay Prison.
Third Spy Mission over Son Tay Prison, in October 1970:
Capt Thach Hén told Capt Chau Dara that the information concerning the American POWs at Son Tay Prison provided by Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray was not conformed to the American expectation. The American commanders had doubt about the accuracy of Capt Nao Eng and Chhin Saray’s information relative to American POWs at Son Tay Prison.
This time, Capt Chau Dara and Capt Chhin Saray were sent to spy Son Tay Prison. The result was: They did see one American POW with a broom and a dozen Cambodian POWs working as team to clean Son Tay Prison recreation court. They saw about 500 North Vietnamese security guards in Son Tay Prison.
But 500 North Vietnamese guards is a big number, said Capt Chau Dara. That means Son Tay Prison is important. Therefore, Son Tay Prison could be served as an incarceration facility to imprison the American POWs.
Fourth Spy Mission over Son Tay Prison, in October 1970:
This time Capt Chau Dara went alone to spy Son Tay Prison.
Capt Chau Dara walked for five days from Lang Hei into Son Tay camp.
As usual, he walked around Son Tay prison to gather information about Son Tay prisoners. He walked about 20 meters outside from Son Tay Prison walls several times in order to scrutinize US POWs inside the prison.
In front of Son Tay Prison narrow and crosswire door (about 70 centimeters width, approximately 35 inches width) toward the middle of the Prison wall, and about seventy meters (78 yards) from that Son Tay Prison door, on Song Con River bank, he dug a trench camouflaged behind shrubs and surrounded by reeds which fostered very well on Song Con River bank. The ground was red volcanic and easy to dig a hole.
From there, through binocular, he observed, the in and out activities of Son Tay Prison, noted the soldier uniforms and counted their numbers and measured the strike distance and marked the evasion route. He slept during the night in this hole/trench in front of that narrow oblique Son Tay Prison door. He discovered around his hole several North Vietnamese booby traps. Then he rendered inoperative all those booby traps he has seen.
Then he reported to Capt Thach Hén: (1) He did see four American POWs at Son Tay prison. Their feet were iron chained. They were very thin and weak and locked in an iron bars cage. The first one was brought in the interrogation center and tortured by the Vietnamese guards because Capt Chau Dara heard their cries and the sound kicks; he was tortured. Nine North Vietnamese girl soldiers led the American POW away and he didn’t see the American POWs return to Son Tay Prison.
Then the three other American POWs followed from behind the first one. The three American POWs were also badly tortured. Then they all disappeared behind the walls.
He did see also dozens Cambodian POWs sweeping the prison recreation court.
Capt Chau Dara assessment: The mix battalion including two dozens female is a sign indicating that the Son Tay Prison security is relaxed. The Vietnamese did not feel imminent dangers. The Vietnamese guards organized joyful activities. It tended to confirm that the American prisoners were not there.
Maybe at that precise moment the North Vietnamese Army are moving all the American POWs out the Son Tay Prison because he saw dozens Vietnamese girl soldiers armed with the AK 47s herded the four iron chained feet American POWs out of Son Tay Prison.
According to Capt Chau Dara, it is noteworthy to point out:
(1) There are 38 trenches recognizable by the two-feet ground elevation hidden by shrubs and grass. Each trench is a reinforced defense position which can lodge easily about a dozen troops and
(2) The Son Tay Prison narrow crosswire door and the prison walls could bee easily destroyed by the Claymore mines, and
(3) The Song Con River is a good evasion route by nylon rope to escape to the opposite Song Con River bank to reach the helicopter extraction zone toward Cambodia.
7. DEPLOYMENT
The perilous Cambodian Special Forces Insertion in Son Tay Prison camp from their base in Cambodia
November 1970, according to the order of the CIA Maj. Ed Neal through Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chau Dara started to deploy his Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 for the assault of Son Tay Prison accordingly to the Rescue Operation Kingpin. As always he led his column.
Nine Chinook Helicopters lifted the Cambodian Special Force Raiders. The Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 led by Capt Chau Dara from Strung Treng Camp base in northern Cambodia toward Lang Hei on Laos/Vietnam border.
Twelve Cambodian elite force led by Capt Chau Dara were the first to be lifted by the first Chinook helicopter. Then those soldiers were dropped by rope from the Chinook. Then one or two Chinook helicopters came at a time to lift the remaining battalion 149 and were dropping the Cambodian troops at different places, but the nine Chinook helicopter dropping zones were within one mile radius.
Then, the Cambodian raiders walked for fifteen days to reach Son Tay camp. By jumping from the Chinook helicopters, five meters above the ground, dozens soldiers were injured by booby traps.
At this point Capt Chau Dara still believed he is the only one in charge of the execution of the whole Rescue Son Tay Operation Kingpin. He still did not know about the participation of the Khmer Krom Capt Thach Hén Battalion 137. He did absolutely know nothing about the American component of Operation Kingpin. (Be Continue @ 3/5)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
5. The Cambodian Genesis of Son Tay Rescue Operation, a Cambodian Concept.
The Cambodian Special Forces Son Tay raider’s leadership did not know the origin of the American plan of Rescue of Son Tay Prison American POWs, the Operation Kingpin.
But, from the Cambodian point of view, there was a Cambodian concept to rescue Cambodian POWs in Son Tay Prison.
Capt Thach Kay had the information that 42 Kanseign Sar POWs were prisoners at Son Tay Prison. They were very badly and very often tortured. Capt Thach Kay discussed with Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chhin Saray and Capt Nao Eng about the feasibility of rescue of those brother Kanseign Sar POWs in Son Tay Prison.
To prove that our brother combatants will never be abandoned and to elevate the moral of the troops, Capt Thach Hén submitted to his supervisor CIA Maj. ED NEAL his ardent intention to rescue the 42 Khmer Krom Kanseign Sar POWs locked in Son Tay Prison who were captured by North Vietnam Army for accomplishing their missions in the North Vietnam.
Capt Chhin Saray had four cousins, Kanseign Sar officers and Capt Nao Eng had two cousins Kanseign Sar officers who were prisoners in Son Tay. For this reason, was born the concept to rescue their cousins locked in Son Tay Prison.
It was Capt Thach Kay and Capt Chhin Sary and Capt Nao Eng who were the first to suggest the operation to rescue their cousin prisoners. They talked to Capt Thach Hén who in return talked to the CIA supervisor Capt ED NEAL.
To do it successfully we need the leadership of Capt Chau Dara, said Capt Chhin Saray because Capt Chau Dara is the only one who knew very well the geography of the area. The surprise would be the best weapon for the success.
Then Capt Thach Hén discussed with Capt Chau Dara about the rescue operation of Son Tay prisoners and simply added that the CIA agreed to pay a lot of money, $5 million dollars for the Rescue of Son Tay POWs.
Capt Chau Dara knew so well Son Tay camp and the nearby surrounding area on Laos-Vietnam border zone because he lived for several years in that region among North Vietnamese soldiers. He knew the minority ethnics in that region; he had friends over there. He had a support team.
From there, maybe, was born the Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin.
Afterward the rescue operation project was taken over by the US Army to rescue its pilot prisoners. Then the project took another direction, then, became the Operation Kingpin.
6. Intelligence about Son Tay Prison
Three months before the Operation Kingpin’s D-Day, Capt Thach Hén, according to the CIA Maj. Ed Neal order, sent Kanseign Sar spies to Son Tay to gather the information relative to the two following crucial points:
(1)Are there American POWs at Son Tay Prison? How Many?
(2) How many North Vietnamese security guards are there in Son Tay Prison?
Three months before the D-Day, in September 1970, according the CIA assignment, Capt Thach Hén ordered Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray to spy the Son Tay Prison.
For this purpose, according to the American concept of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin, a small secret CIA camp base was set near Nong Hêt/Lang Hei, a small Laotian village on Lao-North Vietnam border, Southern of Dien Bien Phu and about 100 miles from Son Tay camp. From Lang Hei, Kanseign Sar spies were sent to spy Son Tay Prison.
First Spy Mission over Son Tay Prison, in September 1970:
Capt Chau Dara remembered very well because it was just before the Buddhist feast Pchum Ben, commemorating the pass away of the loved ones. First Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray walked in for five days to reach Son Tay Prison and reported back in September 1970 to Capt Thach Hén:
(1) They did not see American POW in Son Tay Prison;
(2) There was one battalion of about 500 North Vietnamese security guards at Son Tay Prison.
Second Spy Mission on Son Tay Prison, in September 1970:
Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray were resent to spy Son Tay Prison one more time. They got the same result: They did not see American POWs in Son Tay Prison and there was one battalion of about 500 North Vietnamese security guards at Son Tay Prison.
Third Spy Mission over Son Tay Prison, in October 1970:
Capt Thach Hén told Capt Chau Dara that the information concerning the American POWs at Son Tay Prison provided by Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray was not conformed to the American expectation. The American commanders had doubt about the accuracy of Capt Nao Eng and Chhin Saray’s information relative to American POWs at Son Tay Prison.
This time, Capt Chau Dara and Capt Chhin Saray were sent to spy Son Tay Prison. The result was: They did see one American POW with a broom and a dozen Cambodian POWs working as team to clean Son Tay Prison recreation court. They saw about 500 North Vietnamese security guards in Son Tay Prison.
But 500 North Vietnamese guards is a big number, said Capt Chau Dara. That means Son Tay Prison is important. Therefore, Son Tay Prison could be served as an incarceration facility to imprison the American POWs.
Fourth Spy Mission over Son Tay Prison, in October 1970:
This time Capt Chau Dara went alone to spy Son Tay Prison.
Capt Chau Dara walked for five days from Lang Hei into Son Tay camp.
As usual, he walked around Son Tay prison to gather information about Son Tay prisoners. He walked about 20 meters outside from Son Tay Prison walls several times in order to scrutinize US POWs inside the prison.
In front of Son Tay Prison narrow and crosswire door (about 70 centimeters width, approximately 35 inches width) toward the middle of the Prison wall, and about seventy meters (78 yards) from that Son Tay Prison door, on Song Con River bank, he dug a trench camouflaged behind shrubs and surrounded by reeds which fostered very well on Song Con River bank. The ground was red volcanic and easy to dig a hole.
From there, through binocular, he observed, the in and out activities of Son Tay Prison, noted the soldier uniforms and counted their numbers and measured the strike distance and marked the evasion route. He slept during the night in this hole/trench in front of that narrow oblique Son Tay Prison door. He discovered around his hole several North Vietnamese booby traps. Then he rendered inoperative all those booby traps he has seen.
Then he reported to Capt Thach Hén: (1) He did see four American POWs at Son Tay prison. Their feet were iron chained. They were very thin and weak and locked in an iron bars cage. The first one was brought in the interrogation center and tortured by the Vietnamese guards because Capt Chau Dara heard their cries and the sound kicks; he was tortured. Nine North Vietnamese girl soldiers led the American POW away and he didn’t see the American POWs return to Son Tay Prison.
Then the three other American POWs followed from behind the first one. The three American POWs were also badly tortured. Then they all disappeared behind the walls.
He did see also dozens Cambodian POWs sweeping the prison recreation court.
Capt Chau Dara assessment: The mix battalion including two dozens female is a sign indicating that the Son Tay Prison security is relaxed. The Vietnamese did not feel imminent dangers. The Vietnamese guards organized joyful activities. It tended to confirm that the American prisoners were not there.
Maybe at that precise moment the North Vietnamese Army are moving all the American POWs out the Son Tay Prison because he saw dozens Vietnamese girl soldiers armed with the AK 47s herded the four iron chained feet American POWs out of Son Tay Prison.
According to Capt Chau Dara, it is noteworthy to point out:
(1) There are 38 trenches recognizable by the two-feet ground elevation hidden by shrubs and grass. Each trench is a reinforced defense position which can lodge easily about a dozen troops and
(2) The Son Tay Prison narrow crosswire door and the prison walls could bee easily destroyed by the Claymore mines, and
(3) The Song Con River is a good evasion route by nylon rope to escape to the opposite Song Con River bank to reach the helicopter extraction zone toward Cambodia.
7. DEPLOYMENT
The perilous Cambodian Special Forces Insertion in Son Tay Prison camp from their base in Cambodia
November 1970, according to the order of the CIA Maj. Ed Neal through Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chau Dara started to deploy his Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 for the assault of Son Tay Prison accordingly to the Rescue Operation Kingpin. As always he led his column.
Nine Chinook Helicopters lifted the Cambodian Special Force Raiders. The Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 led by Capt Chau Dara from Strung Treng Camp base in northern Cambodia toward Lang Hei on Laos/Vietnam border.
Twelve Cambodian elite force led by Capt Chau Dara were the first to be lifted by the first Chinook helicopter. Then those soldiers were dropped by rope from the Chinook. Then one or two Chinook helicopters came at a time to lift the remaining battalion 149 and were dropping the Cambodian troops at different places, but the nine Chinook helicopter dropping zones were within one mile radius.
Then, the Cambodian raiders walked for fifteen days to reach Son Tay camp. By jumping from the Chinook helicopters, five meters above the ground, dozens soldiers were injured by booby traps.
At this point Capt Chau Dara still believed he is the only one in charge of the execution of the whole Rescue Son Tay Operation Kingpin. He still did not know about the participation of the Khmer Krom Capt Thach Hén Battalion 137. He did absolutely know nothing about the American component of Operation Kingpin. (Be Continue @ 3/5)
SON TAY Rescue Operation Kingpin is where American CHEAT Cambodian (1/5)
By: SOURN SEREY RATHA & BP
Cambodian Action Committee for Justice & Equity (CACJE)
Cambodian Action Committee for Justice & Equity (CACJE)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
Abstract: One thousand and one hundred Cambodian Special Forces had sacrificed their life in Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin, on November 21st , 1970. They fought bravely against the North Vietnamese division to protect from the Northwestern and Western sides the American Assault Forces which attacked and overran Son Tay Prison.
They were all killed on battleground safe nine.
Without doubt, the Cambodian Special Forces sacrifice had disrupted and stopped the North Vietnamese forces counterattack against the American Assault Forces which subdued Son Tay Prison for a delay time long enough to secure the extraction of the American assault forces.
Indeed, the American assault forces were on the ground for 27 minutes including the extraction by helicopters. During 27 minutes, they attacked victoriously Son Tay Prison, subdued it, opened the Prison cell doors and took off by helicopters, then, returned safely to their Thailand Udon base.
Without the sacrifice of Cambodian Special Forces, the North Vietnamese Forces counterattack would end up by surrounding and annihilating or at least blocking the extraction of the 56 Green Berets and the two helicopters HH-53s Apple 01 – 02 which were the entire American Assault Forces on the ground.
Dear All Readers,
1. On behalf of the three Cambodian Special Forces survivors of Son Tay Rescue Operation known by the code name of Operation “Kingpin”, We write this story to remind the unforgettable sacrifice of one thousand and one hundred (1,100) brave and dedicated Cambodian Special Forces soldiers who were killed in that famous Operation “Kingpin” to rescue the Son Tay American POWs. Indeed, the following was their
MISSION:
On November 21st, 1970, the D-Day,
Cambodian Assault Forces: two Cambodian Special Forces denominated as (a) KANSEIGN SAR Battalion 149 of three hundred soldiers commanded by Capt Chau Dara and (b) the KHMER KROM Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers led by Capt Thach Hén.
CIA Maj. Ed Neal had ordered these two Cambodian Battalion Assault Forces to attack Son Tay Prison from the Western and the Northwestern sides. Attack the North Vietnamese troops outside the Prison. Don’t go inside the Prison.
KANSEIGN SAR Battalion 149 was the Cambodian Special forces formed uniquely of Khmer Krom (Cambodian indigenous of Preah Trapeang province, South Vietnam, but living in Cambodia) equipped and financed by the US.
KHMER KROM Battalion 137 commanded by Capt Thach Hén was a Khmer Krom Special Forces, constituted of 800 soldiers including eight females, Khmer Krom (Cambodian indigenous of Bassac province, South Vietnam living in South Vietnam) equipped and financed and supervised by the US.
H-Hour was November 21st, 1970, 02:18, the starting hour of Rescue Operation Kingpin to assault Son Tay Prison to free the US POWs.
A few minutes before the H-Hour, Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 commander Capt Chau Dara still knew nothing about the American assault forces to overrun Son Tay Prison.
He did not know about the formidable USAF air support.
Indeed, 116 aircraft (28 Forces USAF Primary Aircraft with 148 personal on Objective Area, 29 Forces Support Aircraft and 59 Force Navy Aircraft Diversion) participated in the mission Kingpin.
He knew about the Son Tay American Assault Forces of Operation Kingpin only a few minutes before the Rescue Operation Kingpin had started effectively.
That night, the Cambodian Special Force raiders lay down on their back watching the stars. They saw with their naked eyes for the first time the surrealistic image of the MC-130 “Cherry 01” flying in convoy pulling the five helicopters HH-53s Apple 01-05 and the helicopter HH-3 Banana 01 following from behind.
Indeed, because of large different speeds, the maximum speed of the five heavily loaded HH-53s “Apple 01 - 05” and especially the HH-3 “Banana 01”was far behind the 250 knots low speed of the leading MC-130 “Cherry 01” Combat Talon; these six helicopters had to fly in speed “draft” behind the MC-130, much as racing drivers and cyclist drivers do to increase speed and conserve fuel.
Only at that precise moment, with their naked eyes, they saw the American forces flying in to attack Son Tay Prison.
Sure, the 56 Green Berets had accomplished a formidable job, but humbly and with humility, added Capt Chau Dara: If the Cambodian Special Forces commander got the go of the CIA Maj. Ed Neal, Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 of three hundred elite soldiers, alone, that night, had enough forces to successfully attack, and overrun Son Tay Prison, then, free all the POWs.
Until today, the Son Tay Cambodian commanders of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin still believe that, by surprise, they can successfully execute all the three sequential operations alone: attack, overrun and free the POWs.
The surprise is the supreme factor of success. Three hundreds Kanseign Sar elite forces would succeed to rescue all prisoners because only ninety North Vietnamese soldiers assured inside the guard of Son Tay Prison at that November 21st, 1970 very early morning (02:18 a.m.).
The surprise is: A Cambodian looks like a Vietnamese, that’s the fundamental basis of the surprise that night. Wearing the Vietnamese uniform and Vietnamese cask a Cambodian soldier looks like exactly a Vietnamese Bo Doi’ (VN soldier).
2. It was the CIA Maj. ED NEAL who conceived, financed and equipped and ordered the Cambodian component of Operation “Kingpin”.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Thach Kay and Capt Chau Dara were former Buddhist monks. Hén was a Primary School’s teacher in Kompong Thom, Cambodian province, not far from Pol Pot primary school. Capt Thach Hén knew so well Pol Pot because he taught the class which was two miles far from Pol Pot Primary School. Hén and Kay spoke fluently the English.
Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray spoke fluently the English, French, Lao, Vietnamese and Chinese.
These officers had worked for the CIA for dozen years already.
But only Capt Chau Dara was assigned by the CIA to infiltrate the North Vietnamese Army. The CIA selected from a pool of three thousand Khmer Krom 43 soldiers, then, trained them and sent them to infiltrate the North Vietnamese Army. A few years later, from the 43, only five survived. The others were killed by the war, malaria, the B52s bombing, and denunciation. Capt Chau Dara was among the five survivors.
3. The Fundamental Simple Cambodian Plan of Son Tay Rescue Operation.
The Cambodian plan was very simple. Since there were only ninety North Vietnamese Security guards inside Son Tay Prison, that early morning of November 21, 1970, they would infiltrate and strike by surprise the Son Tay Prison with all the arsenals they brought in with them and kill all the ninety North Vietnamese security guards.
They expected the surprise would be total because they succeeded already to insert on D-Day minus three, one thousand one hundred (1,100) Cambodian special force soldiers around the northwestern and the western side of Son Tay Prison, within a strike distance of one mile from the Son Tay Prison walls.
They would assault, overrun, then free all Son Tay POWs, American and Cambodian, and then profiting the chaos created by the attack they would lead all those freed POWs to the forest on the opposite Song Con River bank and then they would escape to Cambodia toward the helicopter extraction zone.
Maj. Ed Neal, CIA retiree, died in Dallas, Texas, in the mid 1980s.
4. In all the aftermath publication about the Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin there was no trace of the participation of Cambodian Special Forces KANSEIGN SAR and KHMER KROM Battalions in that awesome Operation Kingpin.
However, the truth is: one thousand and one hundred Kanseign Sar Cambodian Special Forces, Khmer Krom soldiers had fought bravely against North Vietnamese Army divisions.
Indeed, when fifty-six Green Berets were lifted by helicopters on November 20th , 1970 from Udon Royal Thailand Air Base in Northern Thailand to assault the Son Tay Prison to free 75+ American prisoners, two Cambodian Battalions were already on the ground, and well positioned to strike and ready to attack and overrun Son Tay Prison: (a) the KANSEIGN SAR Battalion 149 was on the Western side within 500 meters from Son Tay Prison walls and (b) the KHMER KROM Battalion 137 was on Son Tay Prison Northern side, within less than one mile from Son Tay walls.
As the Blueboy assault team led by Army Captain Richard J. Meadows, in the Jolly Green HH-3, crash-landed on time at 02:18 and as planned into the center of Son Tay prison, the only casualty a crew member with a broken ankle, the Cambodian KANSEIGN SAR Battalion 149 led by Capt Chau Dara, according to the CIA Maj. Ed Neal order, assaulted violently Son Tay Prison from the Western side. Then the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 should follow and assault from behind the Kanseign Sar Battalion 149. (Be Continue @ 2/5)
Saturday, January 24, 2009
Cambodian slum dwellers evicted
By Guy De Launey BBC News, Phnom Penh
Police have been overseeing the eviction of hundreds of people from a slum community in the centre of the in the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh.
Residents of Dey Krahorm, who have been fighting eviction for the best part of three years, say they have a legal right to the land.
But the local authorities signed it over to a property developer.
It is the latest in a series of evictions, which have accompanied a dramatic increase in land values.
Dawn operation As the bulldozers moved into Dey Krahorm at dawn on Saturday, residents had little chance of resisting.
Hundreds of military and civilian police accompanied workers from the property developer which bought the land from the city.
At first, they would not allow journalists or human rights workers to observe the eviction, and forcibly removed those who had made it through the barricades.
Dey Krahorm had been the heart of Cambodia's artistic community. Traditional musicians and dancers held classes there in an effort to pass on their skills to the younger generation.
Their instruments could be seen among the rubble, along with the other belongings of the former residents.
"They cannot stand again because of the excessive use of force, of tear gas. A few of my colleagues got hurt more than me," said Yeng Virak of the Community Legal Education Centre (CLEC).
The evicted residents will be taken to land on the outskirts of Phnom Penh.
The local authorities and the developers say they will find better living conditions there, with running water, electricity, health centres and schools.
Phnom Penh's deputy governor, Mann Chhoeun, insists the city has been generous to the people of Dey Krahorm.
But the residents say the negotiations had not finished and that they have not received fair compensation for their land.
They add that moving outside the city centre will stop them from earning a living.
The demise of Dey Krahorm will also cause concern among several other communities threatened with eviction.
Cambodian police use teargas to evict slum dwellers
PHNOM PENH, Jan 24 (Reuters) -
Cambodian police fired teargas and eight people were injured on Saturday during the forced eviction of 80 families from a Phnom Penh slum, rights activists and police said. At least two of the eight slum dwellers were seriously hurt in clashes with clean-up crews hired to tear down the dwellings on government land recently sold to a private company. Police cordoned off roads around the area near the Russian embassy, as the 300 workers backed by bulldozers and cranes cleared away the decade-old community.
Rights activist Am Sam Ath and witnesses said eight people were injured during the forced eviction, including two seriously hurt and sent to hospital.Witnesses said an old woman and a boy were hit by a bulldozer, while others were hurt in clashes with the workers armed with clubs and stones. Police denied using excessive force to evict the group, who had waged a 3-year battle against their eviction."We did not use violence against them, but tear gas to disperse the people who resisted," Phnom Penh police chief G. Touch Naruth told Reuters.The eviction came after the squatters rejected the company's offer of $20,000 per family in compensation for the prime 2-hectare (4.9 acres) plot of land facing the Mekong River.
Land disputes are a hot issue in Cambodia, where garment factories and hotels have sprung up to expand the major textile and tourist industries. Last week, police opened fire on farmers protesting against a land grab south of Phnom Penh, wounding two of them, rights activists said.
(Reporting by Ek Madra; Editing by Darren Schuettler and Alex Richardson)
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia can’t bring Justice for Victims
By: SOURN SEREY RATHA
The mixed National-International Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) issued a statement on August 8, 2008 that its investigating judges issued an indictment upon ending their investigation of Kaing Guek Eav — also known as Duch — who was the overseer of the Phnom Penh prison used as a torture center. Khmer rouge victims welcomes the indictment of Kaing Guek Eav.
However, the ECCC have to broaden and deepen its investigations and prosecutions to include those high ranking officials who commanded the Santibal (Security forces) during the Khmer Rouge regime and ordered and executed those orders that resulted in the mass slaughter of tens of thousands of Cambodians.
Without doubt, the ECCC investigations and verdicts must be based on evidence that is beyond reasonable doubt.
What evidence can the ECCC use on to make its decision about its investigations and verdicts?
According to HUN SEN government, it could be in the form of: Quote
· Documents;
· Physical evidence, such as mass graves and former prisons;
· Statements and testimony by victims, witnesses and defendants.
Thousands of documents have been collected and hundreds of mass graves, prisons and memorials have been mapped by the Research Committee of the Salvation Front (Renakse), the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) and the Cambodian Genocide Program. These will be made available to the court. Unquote
At the Nuremberg Court that was created immediately after the victory of the Allied Forces, the evidence could be reasonably established because the majority was recent, less than four years old, and memories were still fresh; however, the evidence that the ECCC must use for its investigations and verdicts is at least 29 years old and live witnesses may not participate fully and freely – begging the question, “Who would protect the witnesses once the ECCC has finished its job?”
The bulk of evidence that the ECCC used to decide on its investigation and issue its verdict came from the documents of Tuol Sleng Prison, S-21 which were deposed at Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-CAM) and constitutes almost the whole of its archives.
So, the question is:
Can the documents of Tuol Sleng Prison, S-21 be trusted?
Can DC-CAM’s documents be trusted?
Some witnesses who are still living state that when S-21 was liberated in January 1979, S-21 was empty. There was nothing inside. No bones, no archives, nothing. All the bones and skulls which are now displayed at S-21 were transported by trucks from the village of Laang Sala, [Phnom Sam Pov] Battambang province. Those bones and skulls are not those belonging to people who were tortured and executed at S-21.
S-21 was close to Beung Trabek Prison. Beung Trabek Prison was under the watch of Comrade Hong [aka Hor Nam Hong]. More than one hundred thousand people were tortured and slaughtered at Beung Trabek Prison. Compared to Beung Trabek Prison, S-21 is nothing. It was a political decision by the Hanoi inspired regime of Hun Sen in order to make S-21 look more important than Beung Trabek Prison and to cover up the crimes committed there.
The bulk of documents, physical evidence -- such as mass graves and former prisons, and statements and testimony by victims, witnesses and defendants have been fabricated and doctored by Hanoi government officials in collaboration with the Hun Sen regime.
For example, Ta KEU (aka Nhim Sophal), Ta KAO (aka Ros Ngim/Moul Sambath) and Ta PET (in charge of security forces) were respectively the number one, the number two and the number three of the Northwest region (Phumpheak Peay Yorp). Almost one million people died or were slaughtered in that region during the Khmer Rouge regime under their watch 1975-1977.
June 1977, Ta KEU and Ta KAO fled with their 38 headquarter staff officers to Thailand. They escaped by cars and abandoned their cars at Bovel district city, Battambang Province, then, walked toward Thailand. The distance to Thailand border was only a one day walk. They lost their way and fell in Khmer Rouge border guard’s ambush in Anlong Thngan village. The fugitives were all killed. But according to Toul Sleng, S-21/DC-CAM files Ta KEU and Ta KAO were tortured and confessed and recorded a long report and were then killed in Toul Sleng Prison, S-21.
April 21, 1975, Venerable Buddhist monk Chief PON SAMPHEACH, Col. Leng Raoul and others 19 Army officers surrendered to Khmer Rouge Army. KEO (Khmer Rouge Army Division commander), Saravuth (Khmer Rouge Army Brigade commander), Khleng (Khmer Rouge Army Brigade commander) backed up by 40 soldiers accepted their surrender. Then, they transported those people by cars to Veal Bekchan Battambang airport. Not far from the airport, the Khmer Rouge soldiers bound them and killed them all, one by one, and buried their corpses under a tall tree. But according to DC-CAM files, Venerable PON SAMPHEACH was tortured with confession and died at Toul Sleng Prison, S-21.
In order to render justice to family members of these victims, the ECCC broaden and deepen its investigations and prosecutions to include those high ranking officials who commanded the Santibal (Security forces) during the Khmer Rouge regime and ordered and executed those orders that resulted in the mass slaughter of tens of thousands of Cambodians.
Today when US funded 1,8 Million Dollar to ECCC for UN side, at least five thousand people who committed these crimes against humanity live freely in Cambodia.
Does ECCC that expended over cost of almost to hundred millions can bring justice for Khmer rouge victims?
CAMBODIA IS THE PLACE OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND LAND BGRABBING
By: SOURN SEREY RATHA
No body will not be interested when they having to listens the public declaration of Hun Sen who claims that the price of one hectare (1 hectare = 2.47 acres) of land in Phnom Penh is now as high as ten million US dollars. For this reason, during these two last years, some Cambodian people living abroad and inside Cambodia were attracted to land speculation in buying cheap and hoping selling later with a high price.
It is because of this reason that’s why the rich and the power’s family whose close relationship to Hun Sen’s family grabbed land from the poor. All most in provinces of Cambodia land grabbing had been increased and poor people were violated by police and military of Hun Sen. Actually, they can’t believe Hun Sen’s management and his leadership because beside to order military force to shoot people and to make people live insecurity; he can’t bring this country to be a development country such in the world.
Cambodia recorded by the international community as a poorest country, corruption country, violence country, country of immunity culture, free drug trafficking, human trafficking, and family of her leader is very popular as a Family’s Tree [GW report].
Real-estate market is going down since after 2008 election but casino and black money that laundered by the high ranking official of government is still working. The central bank of Cambodia has no rights to release cost of rate of international currency but the private money exchange named Ly Hour is playing role and managed this market. It is because of the owner od Ly Hour has relationship close to Hun Sen’s wife and help a lot to laundering black money for mafias whose work for Hun Sen.
In the same time that Cambodian people live under standard of living, their income is less then $1.00 a day but those high ranking officers, general, and family get involve with Hun Sen’s administration are living in very higher standard than other country officers in the region and prosperous countries.
According to the official survey of December 31, 2007, the rate of people living under the poverty line is 45%, the annual central government budget revenues were just $915.5 million while the annual government expenditures were $1.101 billion, and the Trade: Exports were $4.1 billion while the Trade: Imports were $5.3 b billion.
All the above prove that Cambodia budget was in deficit. It implies that Cambodia integrally depends on foreign aids and foreign loans. Cambodian foreign loans raise to $3.98 billion now.
The government claims that foreign investment plays a key role in Cambodian economic development. Hun Sen is bragging that he attracts more and more foreign investment which is translated by the increase of land price in Phnom Penh to $10 million per hectare even more to $5,000 per square meter in certain Phnom Penh corners. At these prices, Phnom Penh land will cost more than the one in New York or Tokyo.
In spite of repeated bragging of Cambodian government concerning foreign investment from China or Korea and other countries, where is the truth? The reality is: Cambodia has no modern industries but only garments, shoes, cigarettes, natural rubber etc which employ 350,000 workers, and which, in majority, is in the last sequence of production for example labeling the products as if the products were entirely made in Cambodia.
Cambodian government was unable to ameliorate the work conditions of the workers, and repeated disputes on the working and heath conditions of workers were never ever solved. Chea Vichea, the Union leader, was assassinated in the certain public knowledge. The real assassins were never arrested, and the justice never rendered.
With such injustice, with such kangaroo court and with such insecurity, who dare to invest in Cambodia? Nobody would dare to invest in Cambodia in such condition.
To explain how he attracts so much foreign investment Hun Sen advances the argument of the high price of real estate and the rapid real estate development, hotels and resorts and residential estate.
But hidden behind the real estate development, as the Mafia had done in Sicily, it was the black market money laundering which helped the corrupted government, the Mafiosi and terrorists to launder their moneys.
The following activities might help to enlighten this Cambodian money laundering affairs:
The Casinos sprang up like mushroom all along Cambodian borders and Central Phnom Penh.
The casinos served as center of money laundering for corrupted officials, drug dealers, extortionists and arms dealers. They served also as money laundering markets for the speculators of real estate under the economic banner of foreign investment of Hun Sen government.
Since after first election 1993, Mr. Theng Bun Ma, President of Thai Bun Rong Group and Mr. Mong Rithy, President of Mong Rithy Group; whom close friend of Hun Sen, were getting involved in drug dealers.
In 20003, AL-QUEDA members were arrested in Cambodia.
In 2004, Indonesia accuses Cambodia as a place where the arms were funneling to the Indonesian rebels.
In 2007, Thailand suspects that Thai Muslim terrorists have received arms from Cambodia.
Long Chhin Investment, in area of Kap Srauv Dam was dissolved by the government only after the firm had finished its money laundering.
For now, Cambodia is might be a safety’s place that high leader of AL-QUEDA hidden.
Then rumors stated that Cambodian corrupted officials stopped to deposit their moneys in foreign banks in neighboring countries. From there, they started to set up a money laundering center inside Cambodia. They attract all dirty money, corrupted money, extortion money, drug money, arm dealers money, and terrorist moneys. The Cambodian money laundering was intended to pick in crescendo around the beginning of electoral campaign 2008 end up toward the end of 2008.
The Cambodian Central Bank had an extreme low deposit of about $410 million while the corrupted money of Cambodian officials, drug money, arms dealer money, and extortion money were about $20 billion.
Presently, there are 29 casinos had been registering but not include an illegal casinos that defended by high ranking officers. Casinos was in charge for money transfer about one million per day, and this not including the money from the daily selling drug by the generals.
Beside land grabbing that grabbed people’s land Cambodia is also the world black market and money laundering center that international community has not yet paid attention because no body can ensure that Hun Sen’s administration does not have any relationship with AL-QUEDA members since his government has more and build strong relation with Muslim countries.
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
Cambodian casinos out of luck as revenues take a hit
Written by Kay Kimsong
Tuesday, 20 January 2009
Local casino operators report fewer gamblers on both the Thai and Vietnamese borders, with across-the-board cost cuts planned for this year.
THE global economic crisis has hit Cambodia's gaming industry, with casinos on the Vietnamese and Thai borders announcing hefty cost cuts.The local downturn comes amidst a global gambling slowdown affecting casinos worldwide - Macau's gaming industry posted a US$300 million drop in revenues in the last three months of 2008, while US gambling hotspot Nevada reported a 65 percent plunge in takings last year. Cambodia is particularly susceptible: With about 30 casinos, it has more gambling venues than any country in Southeast Asia. Traffic at the Thai border is down sharply with casinos taking a triple hit from the global economic crisis, recent border tensions and a falling Thai baht.At the Kings Crown Casino and Hotel - with locations in Cambodia on both the Thai and Vietnamese borders - the number of visitors has dropped sharply, leading to losses of $620,000 in the last quarter of 2008, the company said.
Tuesday, 20 January 2009
Local casino operators report fewer gamblers on both the Thai and Vietnamese borders, with across-the-board cost cuts planned for this year.
THE global economic crisis has hit Cambodia's gaming industry, with casinos on the Vietnamese and Thai borders announcing hefty cost cuts.The local downturn comes amidst a global gambling slowdown affecting casinos worldwide - Macau's gaming industry posted a US$300 million drop in revenues in the last three months of 2008, while US gambling hotspot Nevada reported a 65 percent plunge in takings last year. Cambodia is particularly susceptible: With about 30 casinos, it has more gambling venues than any country in Southeast Asia. Traffic at the Thai border is down sharply with casinos taking a triple hit from the global economic crisis, recent border tensions and a falling Thai baht.At the Kings Crown Casino and Hotel - with locations in Cambodia on both the Thai and Vietnamese borders - the number of visitors has dropped sharply, leading to losses of $620,000 in the last quarter of 2008, the company said.
The company says it is cutting the work week for its more than 2,000 employees, a move designed to trim costs, said Cambodian Peoples' Party Senator and casino owner Phu Kok An. He told the Post that his company was negotiating with employees to reduce their working month from 30 to 15 days. "We are not laying off workers but they will get 15 days' salary. If your salary is $200 per month, you will get $100."The company currently spends $300,000 a month on salaries, he added. The casino has outlets in Poipet on the Thai border and Chrey Thom district, Kandal province, close to Vietnam. "We are not earning enough income to spend on staffing, water and electricity. When people earn less money, they gamble less," Phu Kok An said.He said that the number of gamblers fell sharply but that the business would remain open.
we are not earning enough income to spend on staffing, water and electricity.
we are not earning enough income to spend on staffing, water and electricity.
"We earned some profit in early 2008 but made losses over three months [in September, November and December 2008], we employ a lot of workers - we are overstaffed - and we're overspending," he said. But Vann Sitha, vice president of New World Casino-Hotel in Bavet on the Vietnam border, said his company does not plan to lay off any of its 700 employees or reduce working hours. Although some staff had resigned, it would continue to recruit, he added."Our casino management has never laid off staff, but some like to move from job to job seeking a better salary offer," he said, adding his business had been less affected by recent events given its location on the Vietnamese border as opposed to the troubled Thai side.
Phat Bun Hour, assistant to Koh Kong Casino owner Ly Yong Phat, also a CPP Senator, declined to comment.Chea Peng Chheang, secretary of state at the Ministry of Finance, is calculating the casino industry's total revenue for 2008, which he said will be completed this week. Revenues are expected to be lower than the $10 million generated in 2007.
Monday, January 19, 2009
Thailand-Cambodia Border Crisis
Kashmir Watch, Jan 19
By Dr. Abdul Ruff Colachal
Important briefs: In 1962, International court awards temple to Cambodia or Kampuchea, but surrounding land remains undesignated; 1970s-1990s: Khmer Rouge guerrillas occupy site; 2001-2002: Thai troops block access over water row; July 2008: Unesco lists temple as a World Heritage Site; July 2008: Thai FM quits after court rules he violated constitution for backing Cambodia's Unesco bid; July 2008: Both sides move troops to temple area; August 2008: Troops withdrawn after high-level talks; October 2008: Fighting erupts around temple area).
Even as the domestic crisis is still looming large in Thailand, there have been some rays of light over resolving the border crisis with its neighbor Cambodia. Thailand and Cambodia have at long last agreed to resolve a border dispute peacefully "for the sake of their neighborliness. More than 1,000 troops have been engaged in a stand-off at the ancient site last year for over month. Tensions have recently been rekindled, and last week erupted into open combat. Three Cambodian and one Thai soldier died in exchanges of fire. Several Cambodian soldiers have been killed recently in an exchange of gunfire with Thai troops along a disputed section of their border. The clash, near the ancient Preah Vihear temple, has prompted Thailand to urge its nationals to leave Cambodia. Tension has been high since July, when hundreds of soldiers on both sides faced off metres apart. Both sides have said they want to find a peaceful solution and will hold talks to discuss the conflict. Accordingly, only a small contingent from each side would remain at Preah Vihear temple.
Senior military officials on both sides echoed the pledge to reduce tensions as they met in Siem Reap in northern Cambodia last year. Both are sides are "committed to exercising their utmost restraint to avoid confrontation or armed clashes", said Cambodian regional army commander Maj Gen Chea Mon. The two sides had agreed to joint border patrols to defuse tensions, but, it appears, these have not materialized. Mutual suspicions are harming the efforts to find any credible solution.
Ancient dispute
The demarcation of land around Preah Vihear temple on the countries' border has never been clearly settled. Disputes between the two countries date back centuries when the Thai and Khmer monarchs fought each other for territory and power. The stand-off between the two countries centres on 1.8 square miles (4.6 sq km) of scrub near the 900-year-old Preah Vihear temple, which sits on a jungle-clad escarpment dividing the countries. The temple is only accessible from Thailand and the area around it is heavily mined - a legacy of Cambodia's long war against the Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The decision by Unesco in June to list Preah Vihear as a World Heritage Site reignited lingering nationalist tensions over unresolved border disputes between the two countries.
The Preah Vihear temple has been the subject of often rancorous debate within Cambodia and Thailand and between the two nations since the very late 19th century. The temple was built during the 9th and 10th centuries by the Khmer Empire. As the empire reached its zenith and began a slow decline, the Ayutthaya Kingdom began its climb to the modern-day state of Thailand.
The recent 2008 Cambodian-Thai stand-off between Cambodia and Thailand began in June 2008 as the latest round of a century-long dispute involving the area surrouding the 11th-century Preah Vihear Temple, located between the Kantharalak district (amphoe) in the Sisaket province of Northeastern Thailand and the Choam Khsant district in the Preah Vihear province of northern Cambodia. Thailand claims that demarcation has not yet been completed for the external parts of the area judged by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962. The dispute has now extended westwards to the Ta Moan Thom complex between the Thai Surin province and the Cambodian Oddar Meancheay province. Furthermore, historians and scholars are expecting that this stand-off will be extended further to the west to the 11th-century Sdok Kok Thom Temple, currently located in the boundary of the Aranyaprathet district in the Sa Kaeo province of eastern Thailand.
The decision by the UN in June2008 to list Preah Vihear as a World Heritage Site reignited lingering tensions. An international court awarded the temple to Cambodia in 1962, but land surrounding it remains the subject of rival territorial claims. In 2003, the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh was torched by rioters angry over the alleged comments of a Thai actress who said that the Angkor Wat temple complex should be returned to Thailand.
Thailand and Cambodia both still claim they own the area around the temple, which recently became a Unesco World Heritage site. Officials from both countries have claimed the other side fired first. Thai Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat said the fighting was "small scale" and that he was committed to reaching a settlement over the issue with Cambodia, which he described as "a good neighbor". After fighting broke out, Thailand alerted air force jets and readied transport planes to evacuate Thai nationals from Cambodia.
There have routine fights on the borders over the disputed site. The military stand-off began in July when Cambodian troops detained three Thai protesters who had entered the site illegally. More than 1,000 soldiers from both countries moved into the area, digging trenches into the rough terrain around the temple. As the result of the recurring tensions, both keep enhancing the military budget at the cost of common men.
In August, military personnel agreed to withdraw most of the troops from the area but in early October, Cambodia claimed that Thai troops had returned. While Cambodia asked the Thai authorities to with forces form Cambodia, Thailand had denied that its troops ever entered Cambodian territory. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to turn the area into a "death zone" if the Thai troops did not withdraw. Such kinds of standoffs have been regular. The two countries have held several rounds of talks but have so far failed to reach a settlement.
Bilateral talks on the issue were held on 24 October 2008 on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe summit (Asem) in Beijing. Foreign ministers from the two countries spoke to reporters after the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Thai counterpart, Somchai Wongsawat, held talks earlier.. Active diplomacy has taken precedence over the usual angry rhetoric. "We are not just neighbors, we are very good friends indeed," Thai Foreign Minister Sompong Amornwiwat said. Hun Sen said the incident that already happened is not the kind that both countries want. It happened instantly. That was uncontrollable at the time." Sompong added that the two sides had been advised to avoid confrontation. Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong said: "What happened between us we have to solve peacefully, amicably, for the sake of our neighborliness."
Post Script: Forward Move
At long last Cambodia and Thailand have reached a deal to withdraw most of their troops from territory both claim at a hill-top temple, following an agreement reached at a meeting of military officers from the two countries on 14 October. The decision to resolve a border dispute Thai-Cambodia dispute peacefully remains a major break though but the implementation of the decision with follow-up actions is yet to begin quite earnestly.
Both Thailand and Cambodia are part of Asean and the member states, with a view to encouraging multi-trade mechanisms in the region, are also trying to help resolve the crisis. As the biggest Asean member country, Indonesia sees a role to help resolve conflict. AFP reported that Thailand and Cambodia on Thursday agreed to joint patrols of disputed border areas after deadly clashes, but made little progress toward resolving their long-standing territorial spat.
Both countries, however, feel that there could be no quick resolution to the problem. It seems Thailand's domestic political situation could prove a distraction - and Cambodia indicated it was not expecting a swift resolution. Since the issue stirs intense nationalist passions on both sides, and an army recruitment drive in border areas has been over-subscribed, the issue calls for more strenuous efforts for reliable resolution.
The author is Delhi based Research Scholar in International Studies and can be reached at abdulruff_jnu@yahoo.com
By Dr. Abdul Ruff Colachal
Important briefs: In 1962, International court awards temple to Cambodia or Kampuchea, but surrounding land remains undesignated; 1970s-1990s: Khmer Rouge guerrillas occupy site; 2001-2002: Thai troops block access over water row; July 2008: Unesco lists temple as a World Heritage Site; July 2008: Thai FM quits after court rules he violated constitution for backing Cambodia's Unesco bid; July 2008: Both sides move troops to temple area; August 2008: Troops withdrawn after high-level talks; October 2008: Fighting erupts around temple area).
Even as the domestic crisis is still looming large in Thailand, there have been some rays of light over resolving the border crisis with its neighbor Cambodia. Thailand and Cambodia have at long last agreed to resolve a border dispute peacefully "for the sake of their neighborliness. More than 1,000 troops have been engaged in a stand-off at the ancient site last year for over month. Tensions have recently been rekindled, and last week erupted into open combat. Three Cambodian and one Thai soldier died in exchanges of fire. Several Cambodian soldiers have been killed recently in an exchange of gunfire with Thai troops along a disputed section of their border. The clash, near the ancient Preah Vihear temple, has prompted Thailand to urge its nationals to leave Cambodia. Tension has been high since July, when hundreds of soldiers on both sides faced off metres apart. Both sides have said they want to find a peaceful solution and will hold talks to discuss the conflict. Accordingly, only a small contingent from each side would remain at Preah Vihear temple.
Senior military officials on both sides echoed the pledge to reduce tensions as they met in Siem Reap in northern Cambodia last year. Both are sides are "committed to exercising their utmost restraint to avoid confrontation or armed clashes", said Cambodian regional army commander Maj Gen Chea Mon. The two sides had agreed to joint border patrols to defuse tensions, but, it appears, these have not materialized. Mutual suspicions are harming the efforts to find any credible solution.
Ancient dispute
The demarcation of land around Preah Vihear temple on the countries' border has never been clearly settled. Disputes between the two countries date back centuries when the Thai and Khmer monarchs fought each other for territory and power. The stand-off between the two countries centres on 1.8 square miles (4.6 sq km) of scrub near the 900-year-old Preah Vihear temple, which sits on a jungle-clad escarpment dividing the countries. The temple is only accessible from Thailand and the area around it is heavily mined - a legacy of Cambodia's long war against the Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The decision by Unesco in June to list Preah Vihear as a World Heritage Site reignited lingering nationalist tensions over unresolved border disputes between the two countries.
The Preah Vihear temple has been the subject of often rancorous debate within Cambodia and Thailand and between the two nations since the very late 19th century. The temple was built during the 9th and 10th centuries by the Khmer Empire. As the empire reached its zenith and began a slow decline, the Ayutthaya Kingdom began its climb to the modern-day state of Thailand.
The recent 2008 Cambodian-Thai stand-off between Cambodia and Thailand began in June 2008 as the latest round of a century-long dispute involving the area surrouding the 11th-century Preah Vihear Temple, located between the Kantharalak district (amphoe) in the Sisaket province of Northeastern Thailand and the Choam Khsant district in the Preah Vihear province of northern Cambodia. Thailand claims that demarcation has not yet been completed for the external parts of the area judged by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962. The dispute has now extended westwards to the Ta Moan Thom complex between the Thai Surin province and the Cambodian Oddar Meancheay province. Furthermore, historians and scholars are expecting that this stand-off will be extended further to the west to the 11th-century Sdok Kok Thom Temple, currently located in the boundary of the Aranyaprathet district in the Sa Kaeo province of eastern Thailand.
The decision by the UN in June2008 to list Preah Vihear as a World Heritage Site reignited lingering tensions. An international court awarded the temple to Cambodia in 1962, but land surrounding it remains the subject of rival territorial claims. In 2003, the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh was torched by rioters angry over the alleged comments of a Thai actress who said that the Angkor Wat temple complex should be returned to Thailand.
Thailand and Cambodia both still claim they own the area around the temple, which recently became a Unesco World Heritage site. Officials from both countries have claimed the other side fired first. Thai Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat said the fighting was "small scale" and that he was committed to reaching a settlement over the issue with Cambodia, which he described as "a good neighbor". After fighting broke out, Thailand alerted air force jets and readied transport planes to evacuate Thai nationals from Cambodia.
There have routine fights on the borders over the disputed site. The military stand-off began in July when Cambodian troops detained three Thai protesters who had entered the site illegally. More than 1,000 soldiers from both countries moved into the area, digging trenches into the rough terrain around the temple. As the result of the recurring tensions, both keep enhancing the military budget at the cost of common men.
In August, military personnel agreed to withdraw most of the troops from the area but in early October, Cambodia claimed that Thai troops had returned. While Cambodia asked the Thai authorities to with forces form Cambodia, Thailand had denied that its troops ever entered Cambodian territory. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to turn the area into a "death zone" if the Thai troops did not withdraw. Such kinds of standoffs have been regular. The two countries have held several rounds of talks but have so far failed to reach a settlement.
Bilateral talks on the issue were held on 24 October 2008 on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe summit (Asem) in Beijing. Foreign ministers from the two countries spoke to reporters after the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Thai counterpart, Somchai Wongsawat, held talks earlier.. Active diplomacy has taken precedence over the usual angry rhetoric. "We are not just neighbors, we are very good friends indeed," Thai Foreign Minister Sompong Amornwiwat said. Hun Sen said the incident that already happened is not the kind that both countries want. It happened instantly. That was uncontrollable at the time." Sompong added that the two sides had been advised to avoid confrontation. Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong said: "What happened between us we have to solve peacefully, amicably, for the sake of our neighborliness."
Post Script: Forward Move
At long last Cambodia and Thailand have reached a deal to withdraw most of their troops from territory both claim at a hill-top temple, following an agreement reached at a meeting of military officers from the two countries on 14 October. The decision to resolve a border dispute Thai-Cambodia dispute peacefully remains a major break though but the implementation of the decision with follow-up actions is yet to begin quite earnestly.
Both Thailand and Cambodia are part of Asean and the member states, with a view to encouraging multi-trade mechanisms in the region, are also trying to help resolve the crisis. As the biggest Asean member country, Indonesia sees a role to help resolve conflict. AFP reported that Thailand and Cambodia on Thursday agreed to joint patrols of disputed border areas after deadly clashes, but made little progress toward resolving their long-standing territorial spat.
Both countries, however, feel that there could be no quick resolution to the problem. It seems Thailand's domestic political situation could prove a distraction - and Cambodia indicated it was not expecting a swift resolution. Since the issue stirs intense nationalist passions on both sides, and an army recruitment drive in border areas has been over-subscribed, the issue calls for more strenuous efforts for reliable resolution.
The author is Delhi based Research Scholar in International Studies and can be reached at abdulruff_jnu@yahoo.com
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