BY: SOURN SEREY RATHA & BP
Cambodian Action Committee for Justice & Equity (CACJE)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
He will know the participation of the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 with the Operation Kingpin only twelve hours before the assault H-Hour. It was Capt Thach Hén who revealed the secret to him.
And he still didn’t know about the main component, the American assault Forces of Operation Kingpin. He knew it only when he saw it with his naked eyes flying over to assault Son Tay Prison.
8. The insertion to the North Vietnam by surface encountered two imminent risks: the risk of dying by the booby trap and the risk of dying by the land mine. Capt Chau Dara, if he had to die, preferred to die by land mine. For this reason, he chose the procedure to avoid the booby trap, that’s, one soldier should follow from behind the other one in locked step; and five meters distance must separate laterally or in column two soldiers. The group leader must have a bamboo pole of five meters long to probe the booby trap. That’s the way the North Vietnamese soldiers moved to avoid the booby traps. That is a procedure, they learned from the North Vietnamese soldiers.
He led the column from the Chinook helicopter dropping zone toward Son Tay Prison. Finally he inserted successfully his 300 special force soldiers on the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The CIA order was: Deploy the whole Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 on the western side of Son Tay prison and the deployment must be completed on November 20th , that’s the D-Day eve (D-Day minus one).
The Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 came from Cambodia. So to reach Son Tay Prison, they had to cross the Song Con River. Indeed, Son Tay Prison was in opposite river bank when coming from Cambodia.
Capt Chau Dara was the first to swim and cross the Song Con River. The Song Con River current was strong during November. With his nylon rope he helped the remaining 300 soldiers to cross the Song Con River at night. They swam at night and used the nylon rope to cross and transport all their armament and ammunitions to the other Son Con River bank. It took three nights for the battalion 149 to cross the Son Con River at night. The battalion 149 was completely inserted on November 20th about 14:00. His troops discovered hundreds and hundreds of booby traps, nearby their emplacement where they were burying in. Then they started to render those surrounding booby traps inoperative.
The operation Kingpin started indeed on November 21st, at 02:18 (a.m.).
Then Capt Chau Dara returned to occupy his old trench in front of the Son Tay Prison narrow door. Capt Chau Dara trench was at the most Southern point of Chau Dara assault line. The remaining 300 soldiers were spreading all along Song Con River bank toward the Northern side of Son Tay Prison.
On D-Day eve, Capt Chau Dara started to count the number of North Vietnamese security guards inside Son Tay Prison.
By counting the guards in and out, and noting the different uniforms they wore, there were in all only ninety soldiers including two dozens female inside Son Tay Prison.
According to Capt Thach Hén order, the Battalion 149 should be within 500 meters from the Son Tay Prison.
Eight hundred yards away far North on the same Son Con River bank was positioned the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep. Then, they were digging and burying and waiting to strike since D-Day eve.
In recapitulation, on H-Hour minus twelve, the Battalion 149 was digging and burying in the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The Battalion 149 arrived first at Son Tay, then, followed the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep.
9. Each Khmer Krom Special Force soldier carried his CAR-15, and M18 for Capt Chau Dara, one 0.357 Magnum handgun, one CIA suicide pistol in shape of cigarette packet with two bullets, 240 CAR-15 rounds, three hand grenades, Claymore mines, and three (tube) TOW 2, communication radio C-25s and foods for fifteen days.
10. It took fifteen days to walk from the camp base to Son Tay Prison. The food rations distributed to each Cambodian soldier were only for fifteen days.
At that time the Cambodian Special Forces leadership did not know why and did not make attention to this revealing point. Only month later, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray understood that the US planers of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin did not expect Cambodian Special Forces would survive. They thought that all Cambodian soldier assault forces would be all exterminated by the North Vietnamese Army. The US strategic planers did not expect Cambodian assault force survivors. They abandoned Cambodian assault forces to their fate.
11. Execution.
The total surprise would be the best weapon for the success.
On November 20, 1970 night, Capt Chau Dara started to cut the protection Son Tay Prison barbed wires, therefore free the access to Son Tay Prison door.
The Capt Chau Dara Battalion 149 was the main assault force of the Cambodian component of Operation Kingpin. Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 had the insigne honor to lead the assault of Son Tay Prison.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Yip Tep and Capt Chhin Saray spoke fluently the English and were in direct communication with the relay communication radio officers of US rescue assault forces while Capt Chau Dara spoke barely the English.
On D-Day eve, about 14:00, that’s H-Hour minus twelve hours, Capt Thach Hén called in Capt Nao Eng. Then, Nao Eng passed the communication radio to Capt Chau Dara. By listening to the clear voice of Capt Thach Hén in his communication radio, Capt Nao Eng knew already that Capt Thach Hén was close to his position. Only at that precise moment, Capt Chau Dara knew that the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén had joint him to assault Son Tay Prison.
12. WHAT IF
Capt Chau Dara and Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray said jokingly to Capt Thach Hén: “Since Son Tay prison was defended by only ninety North Vietnamese security guards, so, let the Battalion 149 assaulted it, subdued it and free all the American POWs.
Capt Chau Dara said: With our 300 Cambodian Special forces soldiers, we can do it. We will sneak inside and attack by surprise. With Claymore mine we will destroy first the narrow door and Son Tay Prison walls. The fundamental basis of the surprise is: the Cambodian look like a Vietnamese. Wearing Vietnamese uniform and cask, the Cambodian Special Forces soldiers look like exactly a Bo Doi’ (Vietnamese soldiers).
The surprise will be total, as had shown our insertion of 1,100 Cambodian Special Forces soldiers in the close perimeter of Son Tay Prison defense line, said Capt Chau Dara.
They waited for the order to implement the very fundamental Cambodian plan to overrun Son Tay Prison and free Son Tay POWs. The green light order will never come.
When the commanding MC 130 “Cherry 01” flying in convoy pulling the five heavily loaded HH-53s “Apple 01 - 05” and the HH-3 “Banana 01” were over and illuminating Son Tay sky, and the HH-3 “Banana 01” was crash-landing inside Son Tay Prison, only then, Capt Chau Dara acknowledged the US forces were coming. But he was not aware the main American ground assault forces were formed only by the 56 Green Berets.
13. Even today, Capt Chau Dara still believed that his battalion 149 with his 300 elite soldiers can overrun Son Tay Prison and free the American POWs.
He still believed he could avoid hundred and hundred booby traps and occupy Son Tay Prison if he had not to run to rescue the crashed-landed HH-3 “Banana 01” inside Son Tay Prison.
His big mistake was to believe that the HH-3 “Banana 01” had crashed inside Son Tay Prison. He did not see it as a controlled landing. For that reason he had to run full speed to rescue the injured “Banana 01” crews in Son Tay Prison.
14. On D-Day minus twelve hours, that is November 20, 14:00 Capt Thach Hén revealed to Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 and Khmer Krom Battalion 137 commanders that the two battalions were assigned conjointly to the same Son Tay Operation Kingpin to free the American POWs at Son Tay.
Separately each battalion commanders knew only about their own assignment to the Son Tay Raid Kingpin. It was a limited assignment, but very important already by itself.
Still each battalion commanders believed they were honored to be chosen to participate in that very important Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Chhin Saray and Capt Chip Tep knew so well the situation was extremely tough.
The H-Hour was November 21, 02:18. At H-Hour, the HH-3 “Banana 01” made a risky crashed landing inside of Son Tay Prison, and disgorged the “Blueboy” assault team of 14 Green Berets led by Capt Richard J Meadows. Then Capt Thach Hén ordered Dara to assault Son Tay Prison.
15. A few minutes before the H-Hour, HH-3 “Banana 01” crashed-landing inside Son Tay Prison, one F-4D-Falcon pilot, on his first swoop, by communication radio, asked Capt Nao Eng, to reconfirm the coordinates of Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 position, then dropped a big CBU (Cluster Bomber Unit).
Then another F-4D Falcon swooped and dropped a couple of CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units). In all Dara saw, the F-4D had dropped three CBUs. A typical 600-pound CBU contains 150 bomblets (3 pounds) which would fall over an area fifty meters wide and two hundred meters long. Any unprotected people within this 50 – by 200 meters area had a better than 50 percent chance of being injured. (Be Continue @ 4/5)
Contact: sournsereyratha@gmail.com
He will know the participation of the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 with the Operation Kingpin only twelve hours before the assault H-Hour. It was Capt Thach Hén who revealed the secret to him.
And he still didn’t know about the main component, the American assault Forces of Operation Kingpin. He knew it only when he saw it with his naked eyes flying over to assault Son Tay Prison.
8. The insertion to the North Vietnam by surface encountered two imminent risks: the risk of dying by the booby trap and the risk of dying by the land mine. Capt Chau Dara, if he had to die, preferred to die by land mine. For this reason, he chose the procedure to avoid the booby trap, that’s, one soldier should follow from behind the other one in locked step; and five meters distance must separate laterally or in column two soldiers. The group leader must have a bamboo pole of five meters long to probe the booby trap. That’s the way the North Vietnamese soldiers moved to avoid the booby traps. That is a procedure, they learned from the North Vietnamese soldiers.
He led the column from the Chinook helicopter dropping zone toward Son Tay Prison. Finally he inserted successfully his 300 special force soldiers on the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The CIA order was: Deploy the whole Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 on the western side of Son Tay prison and the deployment must be completed on November 20th , that’s the D-Day eve (D-Day minus one).
The Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 came from Cambodia. So to reach Son Tay Prison, they had to cross the Song Con River. Indeed, Son Tay Prison was in opposite river bank when coming from Cambodia.
Capt Chau Dara was the first to swim and cross the Song Con River. The Song Con River current was strong during November. With his nylon rope he helped the remaining 300 soldiers to cross the Song Con River at night. They swam at night and used the nylon rope to cross and transport all their armament and ammunitions to the other Son Con River bank. It took three nights for the battalion 149 to cross the Son Con River at night. The battalion 149 was completely inserted on November 20th about 14:00. His troops discovered hundreds and hundreds of booby traps, nearby their emplacement where they were burying in. Then they started to render those surrounding booby traps inoperative.
The operation Kingpin started indeed on November 21st, at 02:18 (a.m.).
Then Capt Chau Dara returned to occupy his old trench in front of the Son Tay Prison narrow door. Capt Chau Dara trench was at the most Southern point of Chau Dara assault line. The remaining 300 soldiers were spreading all along Song Con River bank toward the Northern side of Son Tay Prison.
On D-Day eve, Capt Chau Dara started to count the number of North Vietnamese security guards inside Son Tay Prison.
By counting the guards in and out, and noting the different uniforms they wore, there were in all only ninety soldiers including two dozens female inside Son Tay Prison.
According to Capt Thach Hén order, the Battalion 149 should be within 500 meters from the Son Tay Prison.
Eight hundred yards away far North on the same Son Con River bank was positioned the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 of 800 soldiers led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep. Then, they were digging and burying and waiting to strike since D-Day eve.
In recapitulation, on H-Hour minus twelve, the Battalion 149 was digging and burying in the Western side of Son Tay Prison.
The Battalion 149 arrived first at Son Tay, then, followed the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén and Capt Yip Tep.
9. Each Khmer Krom Special Force soldier carried his CAR-15, and M18 for Capt Chau Dara, one 0.357 Magnum handgun, one CIA suicide pistol in shape of cigarette packet with two bullets, 240 CAR-15 rounds, three hand grenades, Claymore mines, and three (tube) TOW 2, communication radio C-25s and foods for fifteen days.
10. It took fifteen days to walk from the camp base to Son Tay Prison. The food rations distributed to each Cambodian soldier were only for fifteen days.
At that time the Cambodian Special Forces leadership did not know why and did not make attention to this revealing point. Only month later, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray understood that the US planers of Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin did not expect Cambodian Special Forces would survive. They thought that all Cambodian soldier assault forces would be all exterminated by the North Vietnamese Army. The US strategic planers did not expect Cambodian assault force survivors. They abandoned Cambodian assault forces to their fate.
11. Execution.
The total surprise would be the best weapon for the success.
On November 20, 1970 night, Capt Chau Dara started to cut the protection Son Tay Prison barbed wires, therefore free the access to Son Tay Prison door.
The Capt Chau Dara Battalion 149 was the main assault force of the Cambodian component of Operation Kingpin. Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 had the insigne honor to lead the assault of Son Tay Prison.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Yip Tep and Capt Chhin Saray spoke fluently the English and were in direct communication with the relay communication radio officers of US rescue assault forces while Capt Chau Dara spoke barely the English.
On D-Day eve, about 14:00, that’s H-Hour minus twelve hours, Capt Thach Hén called in Capt Nao Eng. Then, Nao Eng passed the communication radio to Capt Chau Dara. By listening to the clear voice of Capt Thach Hén in his communication radio, Capt Nao Eng knew already that Capt Thach Hén was close to his position. Only at that precise moment, Capt Chau Dara knew that the Khmer Krom Battalion 137 led by Capt Thach Hén had joint him to assault Son Tay Prison.
12. WHAT IF
Capt Chau Dara and Capt Nao Eng and Capt Chhin Saray said jokingly to Capt Thach Hén: “Since Son Tay prison was defended by only ninety North Vietnamese security guards, so, let the Battalion 149 assaulted it, subdued it and free all the American POWs.
Capt Chau Dara said: With our 300 Cambodian Special forces soldiers, we can do it. We will sneak inside and attack by surprise. With Claymore mine we will destroy first the narrow door and Son Tay Prison walls. The fundamental basis of the surprise is: the Cambodian look like a Vietnamese. Wearing Vietnamese uniform and cask, the Cambodian Special Forces soldiers look like exactly a Bo Doi’ (Vietnamese soldiers).
The surprise will be total, as had shown our insertion of 1,100 Cambodian Special Forces soldiers in the close perimeter of Son Tay Prison defense line, said Capt Chau Dara.
They waited for the order to implement the very fundamental Cambodian plan to overrun Son Tay Prison and free Son Tay POWs. The green light order will never come.
When the commanding MC 130 “Cherry 01” flying in convoy pulling the five heavily loaded HH-53s “Apple 01 - 05” and the HH-3 “Banana 01” were over and illuminating Son Tay sky, and the HH-3 “Banana 01” was crash-landing inside Son Tay Prison, only then, Capt Chau Dara acknowledged the US forces were coming. But he was not aware the main American ground assault forces were formed only by the 56 Green Berets.
13. Even today, Capt Chau Dara still believed that his battalion 149 with his 300 elite soldiers can overrun Son Tay Prison and free the American POWs.
He still believed he could avoid hundred and hundred booby traps and occupy Son Tay Prison if he had not to run to rescue the crashed-landed HH-3 “Banana 01” inside Son Tay Prison.
His big mistake was to believe that the HH-3 “Banana 01” had crashed inside Son Tay Prison. He did not see it as a controlled landing. For that reason he had to run full speed to rescue the injured “Banana 01” crews in Son Tay Prison.
14. On D-Day minus twelve hours, that is November 20, 14:00 Capt Thach Hén revealed to Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 and Khmer Krom Battalion 137 commanders that the two battalions were assigned conjointly to the same Son Tay Operation Kingpin to free the American POWs at Son Tay.
Separately each battalion commanders knew only about their own assignment to the Son Tay Raid Kingpin. It was a limited assignment, but very important already by itself.
Still each battalion commanders believed they were honored to be chosen to participate in that very important Son Tay Rescue Operation Kingpin.
Capt Thach Hén, Capt Chau Dara, Capt Nao Eng, Capt Chhin Saray and Capt Chip Tep knew so well the situation was extremely tough.
The H-Hour was November 21, 02:18. At H-Hour, the HH-3 “Banana 01” made a risky crashed landing inside of Son Tay Prison, and disgorged the “Blueboy” assault team of 14 Green Berets led by Capt Richard J Meadows. Then Capt Thach Hén ordered Dara to assault Son Tay Prison.
15. A few minutes before the H-Hour, HH-3 “Banana 01” crashed-landing inside Son Tay Prison, one F-4D-Falcon pilot, on his first swoop, by communication radio, asked Capt Nao Eng, to reconfirm the coordinates of Kanseign Sar Battalion 149 position, then dropped a big CBU (Cluster Bomber Unit).
Then another F-4D Falcon swooped and dropped a couple of CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units). In all Dara saw, the F-4D had dropped three CBUs. A typical 600-pound CBU contains 150 bomblets (3 pounds) which would fall over an area fifty meters wide and two hundred meters long. Any unprotected people within this 50 – by 200 meters area had a better than 50 percent chance of being injured. (Be Continue @ 4/5)
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